Semantics of Two Emotion Verbs in Russian: BOJAT’SJA ‘to be afraid’ and NADEJAT’SJA ‘to hope’

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I
Introduction

The Problems. The present paper addresses two notorious problems of linguistic semantics and lexicography: the DIVISION OF SENSES of a polysemous word and the CHOICE OF SEMANTIC COMPONENTS for the definition of each sense. Both problems are intimately interwoven; nevertheless, we try to separate them and consider them in two different sections.

We will not engage in a theoretical discussion but will propose practical solutions based on the data and the lexicographic treatment thereof. We hope, however, that our results have some general interest: first, they illustrate the Meaning-Text approach to semantics and lexicography; and second, they seem to be applicable to many similar phenomena, enhancing, among other things, the standardization of the semantic and lexicographic description of the vocabulary of emotion.

The Data. The paper examines two Russian emotion verbs: BOJAT´SJA ‘to be afraid’ and NADEJAT´SJA ‘to hope’. These verbs are interesting for at least three general reasons:

— BOJAT´SJA and NADEJAT´SJA are abstract words. Dividing their senses is theoretically challenging: since the referents of abstract words are not observable, it is difficult to distinguish them and, consequently, the corresponding lexical senses. When dealing with abstract words, purely linguistic criteria — such as syntactic and lexical cooccurrence or the existence of related expressions — acquire a major role. Because of this, abstract words are important semantic and lexicographic targets. As far as BOJAT´SJA and NADEJAT´SJA are concerned, their semantics is rather nontrivial; it involves such theoretically important oppositions as ‘assertion ~ presupposition’, ‘descriptive ~ non-descriptive [senses]’, ‘factive ~ quasi-factive ~ non-factive’, ‘literal ~ metaphorical’, ‘event ~ property’ and ‘emotion ~ belief’.

— BOJAT´SJA and NADEJAT´SJA refer to emotional states, which, as is known, involve a rich and elaborate vocabulary. The vocabulary of emotion has been the object of intensive investigations in many languages and still remains a hotly debated field. However, most of these investigations belong to psychology and philosophy, where the number of publications concerning emotions is astronomical; there even is a specialized journal (Cognition and Emotion, which first appeared in 1987). Naturally, these publications concentrate on the EMOTIONS themselves rather than attempting to analyze emotion WORDS; psychologists and philosophers have been trying for years to define the nature of emotions, establish major dimensions for classifying them, etc. Many
of their findings are extremely valuable for linguistics: after all, emotion words reflect, more or less, emotional reality, while in order to speak about emotional reality, scholars have to use emotion words (especially in experiments with the human perception of emotions). We tried to take into consideration at least some of the recent psychological and philosophical research, although we by no means claim a reasonably complete coverage.


— BOJAT’SJA and NADEJAT’SJA cover a vast range of real-world situations: for instance, there is a huge difference between real feelings experienced in the situation On boitsja, čto ego ub'jut ‘He is afraid that he might be killed’ as opposed to the situation On boitsja, čto v ego stat’e est’ netočnosti ‘He is afraid that his paper might contain inaccuracies’. However, we believe that in both of these sentences BOJAT’SJA has the SAME LINGUISTIC MEANING; therefore, in order to be applicable to all corresponding real-world situations, this meaning should be formulated in a fairly general way. (The identity of linguistic meaning of the verb BOJAT’SJA in both of the above sentences is borne out, as will be shown below, by the identity of their paraphrase potential and lexical cooccurrence: see p. 00.) The verbs in question bring up the problem of semantic oscillation: it may appear that we are dealing with a LINGUISTIC-SEMANTIC continuum, while in point of fact we have here clear-cut linguistic meanings being stretched to cover various parts of the REAL-WORLD continuum. 2

The semantics of Russian emotion verbs, including these two, was studied in Iordanskaja 1970 (although only their purely emotional senses were considered). Later, new full-fledged lexicographic descriptions of a number of Russian emotion verbs and nouns were developed; they appeared in Mel’čuk and Žolkovskij 1984, BOJAT’SJA and NADEJAT’SJA being among them, this time, with all of their senses included. Thus we were already familiar with the issues involved, when in the ’80s, three important papers took up the verbs in question once again. On the one hand, Anna Zaliznjak (1983 and 1985) put forth some new ideas concerning what she calls ‘predicates of internal state’ (including BOJAT’SJA and NADEJAT’SJA), establishing, in particular, the importance of the distinction between the assertional and the presuppositional part in their definitions. On the other hand, D.Weiss (1987) pointed out several inconsistencies in the treatment of these verbs in Mel’čuk and Žolkovskij 1984. In reworking the descriptions of BOJAT’SJA and NADEJAT’SJA for the present paper, we did our best to take into account Zaliznjak’s and Weiss’ suggestions — although we by no means followed all of them literally.

**The Goal, the Theoretical Framework and the Organization of the Paper.** The presentation is focused on the METHODOLOGY of semantic research with strong lexicographic bias: our purpose is to demonstrate how we proceed when dividing senses of a polysemous word and
choosing semantic components in the formulation of the definitions. (For the principles we adhere to as well as the criteria we use, see Mel’čuk 1988b.)

The general framework adopted is that of the Meaning-Text Theory (Mel’čuk 1974, 1981, 1988a: 43-101). In this theory, the meaning, or the definition, of a word (taken in one sense) is, roughly speaking, its paraphrase in terms of carefully selected words of the same language (the trend initiated in the early ‘60s by A. Zholkovsky, A. BogusLawski and A. Wierzbicka). Such a definition of a word only seeks to ensure the proper use of the defined word in the text, especially — in paraphrasing and determining lexical cooccurrence. Thus our approach is STRICTLY LINGUISTIC in the narrowest sense of the term: while most of the psychological works are aimed at finding the universal structure of real emotions, we are interested exclusively in language-specific meanings of emotion words. (The language-specific character of emotion meanings is well substantiated in Wierzbicka 1986.) Moreover, unlike, e.g., Lakoff (1987) or Kövecses (1988), who try, by studying the uses of emotion expressions (mostly, current metaphors) in a given language, to arrive at an ‘everyday’ CONCEPTUAL MODEL of the corresponding emotion — as it is perceived and expressed in actual speech, we, on the contrary, concentrate on MEANINGS and LINGUISTIC BEHAVIOUR of emotion words (leaving out emotions as such).

In order to facilitate the reading of the paper, we relegate Russian lexical entries (which underly our account) to the last section. We start (Section II) with the semantic Oppositions whereby we divide the senses (= different lexemes) of BOJAT´SJA ‘to be afraid’ and NADEJAT´SJA ‘to hope’, and then (Section III) we discuss individual semantic components in their definitions, trying to justify the solutions we propose. Then (Section IV) several conclusions are formulated, characterizing the special place BOJAT´SJA and NADEJAT´SJA occupy among the emotion verbs of Russian. Finally (Section V), the full improved versions of the lexical entries for BOJAT´SJA and NADEJAT´SJA are given.

II
Division of Senses

We examine first the polysemy of BOJAT´SJA, which is more complex, and then that of NADEJAT´SJA. To begin with, we present the semantic description of each verb. This is done in English, in spite of our own principle that semantic (= lexicographic) definitions of words of a language must be written only in terms of other words of the same language. This principle, which follows from semantic incommensurability of linguistic meanings in different languages, is fully observed in the Russian lexical entries in Section V; here we sacrifice it in order to make the exposition easier.

BOJAT´SJA ‘to be afraid’

We divide all the observable uses of BOJAT´SJA as follows.

BOJAT´SJA.1a (Petja boitsja tvoju sobaku ‘P. is afraid of your dog’; Neopytnyj lyžnik boitsja
An unexperienced skier is afraid of falling; I’m afraid of eating salted things [lest I become thirsty]):

\[ \text{X boitsja Y-a} = \]
\[ \text{‘X expects that Y will cause something undesirable for X} \]
\[ \text{or} \]
\[ \text{X is or has the property of being in an unpleasant emotional state with respect to Y, which} \]
\[ \text{is caused by the said X’s expectation,} \]
\[ \text{this state being such as is usually caused by the expectation of something dangerous,} \]
\[ \text{this expectation and/or state causing X to tend to avoid Y’.} \]

BOJAT´SJA I.1b (Petja boitsja, čto tvoja sobaka ego ukusit ‘P. is afraid that your dog will bite him’; Neopytnyj lyžnik boitsja upast ‘An unexperienced skier is afraid that he might fall’):

\[ \text{X boitsja, čto Y} = \]
\[ \text{‘Wishing the fact Y not to take place,} \]
\[ \text{X expects that Y will take place or believes it very likely that Y has taken or is taking place} \]
\[ \text{or} \]
\[ \text{X is in an unpleasant emotional state with respect to Y,} \]
\[ \text{which is caused by the said X’s expectation or belief,} \]
\[ \text{this state being such as is usually caused by the expectation of something dangerous,} \]
\[ \text{this expectation and/or state causing X to tend to avoid Y’.} \]

BOJAT´SJA I.1c (Petja bojalsja za svoi lyži ‘P. was afraid that something undesirable might happen to his skis’):

\[ \text{X boitsja za Z-a.} = \]
\[ \text{‘X is afraid [= B.I.1b] that Z will undergo or has undergone an event undesirable for X’.} \]

BOJAT´SJA I.2 (Bojus’, čto vy nepravy ‘I’m afraid, you are wrong’; Vaš syn, ja bojus’, ne vyderžit êkzamen ‘Your son, I’m afraid, won’t pass this exam’):

\[ (Ja = X) bojus’, (čto ) Y = \]
\[ \text{‘Being certain that the fact Y has taken, is taking or will take place, which is not} \]
\[ \text{known to the addressee,} \]
\[ \text{the speaker X represents the state of affairs as if X [only] believed that Y has taken, is} \]
\[ \text{taking or will take place; and} \]
\[ \text{believing that Y is undesirable for the addressee or X,} \]
\[ \text{X expresses his being upset because of Y} \]
\[ \text{[— as if X were afraid for the addressee or himself]’.} \]

BOJAT´SJA II (Rozy bojatsja xoloda ‘Roses are sensitive to cold’):

\[ \text{X boitsja Y-a} = \]
\[ \text{‘Inanimate X is such that the action of Y upon X damages X [— as if X were afraid of Y]’}. \]

The above division and grouping of senses can be explained as follows.

1) The main boundary separates all psychological senses of BOJAT´SJA [B.I.1a, I.1b, I.1c, I.2] from that sense of BOJAT´SJA which describes a (physical) property of an inanimate object [B.II].

**The Psychological State** [BOJAT´SJA I] vs. **The (Physical) Property** [BOJAT´SJA II]:

- Literal vs. Metaphorical Meaning.
(1) Ivan boitsja [= B.I.1a] vody ‘I. is afraid of water’.

vs.

Ètot material boitsja vody ‘This fabric is sensitive to [lit. ‘is afraid of’] water’.

The B.II sense [= ‘be sensitive to’] is obviously a result of a metaphorical transfer.

2) Within the psychological BOJAT’SJA [B.I], we separate the three descriptive senses, referring to emotion or expectation/belief [I.1a, b and c], from the non-descriptive, or expressive, sense [I.2].

Referring to Expectation / Belief or Emotion [BOJAT’SJA.I].

vs. Expressing an Emotion [BOJAT’SJA.II]:

Different Dominant Components.

All three senses of BOJAT’SJA are descriptive: they have as one of their dominant semantic components the component ‘to be in an emotional state ...’ (in B.I.1a and B.I.1b it is explicitly present; in B.I.1c it is implicit: by reference to B.I.1b), which means that they can all refer to, or describe, an emotion. However, they need not: they can also refer to pure expectation or belief, as in (2), where the fearful emotion does not come into play:

(2) a. Molodye ljudi obyčno bojatsja otvetstvennosti. ‘Young people are, as a rule, afraid of responsibility’.

b. Bojus’ est’ solennoe: potom pit zaxočetsja ‘I am afraid to eat salted things: afterwards I’ll be thirsty’.

In this respect, BOJAT’SJA (and, as we will see later NDJEJAT’SJA is different from genuine emotion verbs, such as RADOVAT’SJA ‘to be happy / glad’, OGORČAT’SJA ‘to be upset/sorry’, UDIVLJAT’SJA ‘to be surprised’ and SERDIT’SJA ‘to be angry’: the latter always refer to an emotion. BOJAT’SJA and NADEJAT’SJA could therefore be called weakly emotional. As pointed out in Zaliznjak 1985: 22, these two verbs belong to an intermediate class of predicates—intermediate between purely emotional (‘to be happy, upset, surprised’) and purely mental (‘to believe, expect, know’) predicates.

Unlike BOJAT’SJA.I, the verb BOJAT’SJA.II is non-descriptive — it does not refer to an emotion (none of its two dominant semantic components is ‘to be in an emotional state ...’), but to a speech action by the speaker (‘the speaker represents the state of affairs as if...’ and the speaker expresses [his emotion...’]; see Subsection III.5, p.00.

The semantic contrast between B.I.1 and B.I.2 manifests itself in their different linguistic behaviour with respect to their paraphrase potential, lexical cooccurrence and absolutive use.

• Paraphrase Potential. B.I.1a, B.I.1b and B.I.1c can all be paraphrased by a typical emotion expression such as ispytyvat’, strax, lit. ‘to experience fear’:

(3) On boitsja \[
\{ \text{sobak [B.I.1a] \}, \text{2cto otec priedet [B.I.1b] \} = On ispytyvaet strax \}
\]

\[
\text{za syna [B.I.1c] \}
\]

lit. ‘He is afraid = experiences fear of dogs that Father will come for his son’.

B.I.2 cannot be so paraphrased (Vy, ja bojus’, ošibětes’ adresom ‘You, I’m afraid, will have the wrong address’ ≠ Ja ispytyvaju strax, čto vy ošibětes’ adresom , lit.‘I experience fear that you...’):
will have the wrong address’).

- **LEXICAL COOCCURRENCE.** B.I.1a, B.I.1b and B.I.1c admit all such adverbials as, e.g., Ľutko <paničeski, bezumno, ...>, lit.’terribly<hysterically, madly, ...>’, which obviously characterize the intensity of the emotion:

(4) On  
\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{2} \text{zutko} \\
&\text{pani2ceski} \\
&\text{bezumno}
\end{align*}
\right\} \text{boitsja}, \left\{ \begin{align*}
&\text{sobak} \ [\text{B.I.1a}] \\
&\text{2cto otec priedet} \ [\text{B.I.1b}] \\
&\text{za syna} \ [\text{B.I.1c}]
\end{align*}\right\}
\]

lit. ‘He is \{terribly \{hysterically \{madly\} \} afraid \{of dogs \{that Father will come \} \} \{for his son\}’.

Unlike these senses, B.I.2 does not combine with the adverbials in question (Vy, *uŽasno bojus’, ošibëtes’ adresom ‘You, I’m terribly afraid, will use the wrong address’).

- **ABSOLUTIVE USE.** B.I.1a, I.1b and I.1c can all be used without the second syntactic actant: 5

(5) — Da 2 cto s_nim? ‘What’s the matter with him?’ — On boitsja ‘He is afraid’.

[Possible continuations:
— čego? ‘What [is he afraid] of?’
— \left\{ \begin{align*}
&\text{Sobaku} \ [\text{B.I.1a}] \\
&\text{2cto otec priedet} \ [\text{B.I.1b}] \\
&\text{On boitsja za syna} \ [\text{B.I.1c}]
\end{align*}\right\}
\]

Of the dog  \\{\text{That Father will come}\} \\{For his son\}

This is completely impossible for the non-descriptive B.I.2: Ja bojus’ ‘I’m afraid’ can only denote my emotional state (and represent one of the three senses of B.I.1).

It is true that the intensity of the emotional state in question can vary widely: it is of course one thing to be afraid of arriving late at a party, or of making a spelling mistake, and quite another of falling into an abyss or the like. Yet the actual degree of the EMOTIONAL response depends on the extralinguistic situation and should not be reflected in the definitions of B.I.1a, b, c. What we are saying here is that, given an appropriate state of affairs, each one of B.I.1 can be used to describe the corresponding emotion.

Note that the verb OPASAT’SJA’to apprehend, to be anxious’, semantically quite close to BOJAT’SJA in, does not imply an emotion at all. It can describe similar situations as B.I.1:

(6) On opasaetsja \left\{ \begin{align*}
&\text{sobak} \\
&\text{2cto otec priedet} \\
&\text{za syna}
\end{align*}\right\}
\]

‘He is anxious \{because of the dogs \{that Father will come \} \} \{for his son\}’.

However, in contradistinction to BOJAT’SJA, OPASAT’SJA does not cooccur with ‘emotional’ adverbials and does not admit an absolutive use:

(7) *? On  
\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{2zutko} \\
&\text{pani2ceski} \\
&\text{bezumno}
\end{align*}
\right\} \text{opasaetsja} \left\{ \begin{align*}
&\text{sobak} \\
&\text{2cto otec priedet} \\
&\text{za syna}
\end{align*}\right\}
\]

(8) *On opasaetsja.

3) In their turn, the three senses of BOJAT’SJA referring to emotion are divided according to the content of the expectation each one implies; roughly speaking, X expects something undesirable from Y [I.1a] vs. X expects that an undesirable Y will take place [I.1b,c]: ‘A sentence with BOJAT’SJA[I] is an affirmation of the NEGATIVE CHARACTER of a probable event, while
a sentence with BOJAT`SJA in [ = our B.1b, c] is an affirmation of the PROBABILITY of a negative event' (Zaliznjak 1985: 16). More precisely, BOJAT`SJA1.1a is opposed to BOJAT`SJA1.1b, c in the following four respects.

• Y Will Cause Something Undesirable for X [BOJAT`SJA 1.1a] vs. Y Will Take Place [BOJAT`SJA 1.1b, c]:
  Assertion vs. Presupposition.

Following the proposal in Zaliznjak 1983 and 1985, where the distinction in question with respect to BOJAT`SJA was first established, we divide each of the BOJAT`SJA1.1b and 1.1c senses into the PRESUPPOSITIONAL part (a graphically highlighted — i.e. indented — gerund construction at the very beginning of the B.1b definition, p. 4) and the ASSERTIONAL part (all the rest; in B.1.1c the presupposition is implicit: through the inclusion of B.1.1b, see below, p.00).

The assertions of the three BOJAT`SJA1.1 all refer to the same emotion, caused, however, by different expectations (they can also refer simply to different expectations): in B.1.1a, X expects that Y will do something undesirable to him, while in B.1.1b, c X expects or believes that something undesirable for him — Y or an event affecting Z — is very likely. Thus ‘B.1.1a’ and ‘B.1.1b, c’ contain essentially the same components, which, however, are arranged into different communicative patterns: in ‘B.1.1a’ the component ‘Y will do X something undesirable’ belongs to the ASSERTION, while in ‘B.1.1b, c’ the similar component (‘X wishes Y not to take place’) is part of the PRESUPPOSITION (‘Y is undesirable for X’ = ‘X wishes Y not to take place’). This difference becomes obvious when the corresponding lexemes are in the scope of negation, since, as is well known, only the assertion can be negated (leaving aside of course the contrastive and the metalinguistic negation). Thus sentence (9):

(9) Sveta ne boitsja [B.1a] xudet’ ≠ ‘Sveta is not afraid of losing weight’.

can only mean that Sveta does not expect anything undesirable from the process itself of losing weight or from the results thereof. On the contrary, sentence (10):

(10) Sveta ne boitsja [B.1a or 1.1b] poxudet’ ≠ ‘Sveta is not afraid that she’ll lose weight’.

is ambiguous between the meaning of (9) and ‘Sveta does not expect that her losing weight [which is undesirable for her = the presupposition] will take place’.

A similar division into assertion and presupposition is carried out in NADEJAT`SJA1, see p.00.

Let us emphasize that the definitions of B.1.1a and B.1.1b feature no complete (anti)symmetry in this respect: the ‘taking place’ component (in B.1.1b’s assertion) is altogether absent from ‘B.1.1a’, where — according to the requirement of symmetry — it should constitute the presupposition. But, in the first place, this presupposition should be expressed more precisely: as ‘perceiving or thinking of Y’, not as ‘Y taking place’ (with ‘be afraid of Y’, the mere existence of Y is not sufficient for you to be afraid of it: you have to perceive Y or think of Y). And furthermore, we chose not to include it into the definition of B.1.1a at all. The reason is that we don’t want to have in a definition what we consider to be a ‘non-specific’ presupposition, i.e., a presupposition that follows from the assertion. Thus, the assertion ‘X expects something from Y’ automatically entails the
presupposition ‘X perceives Y or is thinking of Y’. Since in all emotion-word definitions the assertion includes the evaluation of Y by X (which entails the perception of Y or the imagining of Y by X), we think that the presupposition ‘X perceives Y or is thinking of Y’ is redundant in all these definitions.

• Emotional Event or Emotional Property [BOJAT´SJA1.1a]  
  vs. Emotional Event [BOJAT´SJA1.1b, e]:  
  Specific vs. Generic Y

All three senses of BOJAT´SJA1.1 include the disjunction ‘expectation / belief OR emotion’, which has been discussed above (p. 00). However, the emotion component in BOJAT´SJA1.1a contains, in its turn, a further disjunction, absent from the two other emotional senses of BOJAT´SJA1.1 (B.1.1b and B.1.1c). This disjunction is necessary because the meaning ‘B.1.1a’ is, in fact, applicable to two different real-world situations: X is in an actual emotional state [= an event] brought about by a SPECIFIC REFERENTIAL Y (= an object or a situation), as in (11), or X has a permanent emotional property — an attitude with respect to a GENERIC NON-REFERENTIAL Y (= a class of objects or situations), as in (12):  

(11) Ty ne vidiš, čto rebënok boitsja ètu sobaku? ‘Don’t you see that the child is afraid of this dog?’  
(12) Naš rebënok boitsja sobak ‘Our child is afraid of dogs’.

BOJAT´SJA1.1a even governs two special surface forms — the accusative and a highly colloquial čto-construction — to express the specific referential character of Y and another special surface form — a kogda-construction — for a generic Y: see the Government Pattern on p.00. (The three remaining surface forms that the verb BOJAT´SJA1.1a governs are ambiguous in this respect.)

Nevertheless, it is impossible to split the ‘B.1.1a’ sense into two separate senses because both can appear simultaneously in the same occurrence of BOJAT´SJA1.1a:  

(13) Sveta očen’ boitsja ètoj poezdkì [specific] i voobše vsex takix poezdok [generic] ‘S. is very much afraid of this trip and of all similar trips in general’.

We are applying here the Apresjan Criterion (Apresjan 1974: 85):

If a lexical unit L which has two presumed subsenses ‘C₁’ and ‘C₂’ can simultaneously cooccur with lexical units L₁ and L₂ such that L₁ corresponds to ‘C₁’ and L₂ to ‘C₂’ (without producing a special stylistic effect of wordplay), then both subsenses must remain in the same definition and be linked by a (non-strict) disjunction.

In (13), L = bojat’ sja, L₁ = ètoj poezdkì, L₂ = vsex takix poezdok; ‘C₁’ is ‘be in an emotional state’, while ‘C₂’ is ‘have an emotional property’. To account for sentences of the type of (13), we use a disjunction in the definition in question: ‘is or has the property of being in an emotional state’.

In contrast, BOJAT´SJA1.1b and 1.1c do not need such a disjunction; they cannot refer to an emotional property: Jura boitsja za syna ‘J. is afraid for his son’ refers to an actual emotional state only (as opposed to Jura boitsja temnoty ‘J. is afraid of the dark’). Even with a modifier of the type ‘always’, ‘constantly’, etc. these verbs still refer to emotional events, which are, however, constant-
ly recurring. But since constantly recurring emotional events pragmatically imply a corresponding emotional property, one might think that in, e.g., *Jura postojece boitsja za syna* ‘J. is constantly afraid for his son’ the verb *boitsja* refers to a property, which, in actual fact, is not the case.

- **Future Undesirable Event** [BOJAT’SJA1.1a] vs. **Future, Present or Past Undesirable Event** [BOJAT’SJA1.1b, c]:

  **Time Orientation**

  BOJAT’SJA1.1a is exclusively future-oriented: the undesirable event (caused by Y) can only be in the future with regard to the time of the emotional state; it can never have already happened previously to the state or take place simultaneously with it. Unlike this, both BOJAT’SJA1.1b and I.1c can refer to future, present or past undesirable events Y:

  BOJAT’SJA1.1a

  (14) *Ja bojus’, čtoby Maša xodila v školu odna* ‘I am afraid for Masha to go to school alone’.

  and

  (15) *Ja bojus’, kogda Maša xodit v školu odna* ‘I am afraid when M. goes to school alone’.

  Both sentences refer to future undesirable events; it is impossible to construct a sentence with B.1.1a referring to a past event.

  BOJAT’SJA1.1b

  (16) *Ja bojus’, ne pojdët <xodit, pošla>li Maša v školu odna* ‘I am afraid that M. will go <goes, went>to school alone’.

  BOJAT’SJA1.1c

  (17) *Ja bojus’ za Mašu: ne pojdët, <xodit, pošla>li ona v školu odna* ‘I am afraid for M.: won’t she <doesn’t / didn’t she> go to school alone’.

  The distinction in question is reflected by using different tenses of the verbs in the proposed definitions: in B.1.1a the tense is the future (‘will do’), and B.1.1b, c show all three tenses (‘will take, has taken or is taking place’).

- **Expect** [BOJAT’SJA1.1a] vs. **Expect or Believe to Be Very Likely** [BOJAT’SJA1.1b, c]:

  **People** vs. **Animals**

  B.1.1a admits as its grammatical subject a human or an animal noun without restriction, while with B.1.1b, c an animal subject is normally used only when Y refers to a future event:

  BOJAT’SJA1.1a

  (17) Belki bojatsja

  Belki bojatsja *ko2sek prygaš $2cerez ogonš, čtoby ix trogali za xvost, kogda ix trogajut za xvost* ‘Squirrels are afraid of cats to jump over fire to be touched on the tail when one touches them on the tail’.

  BOJAT’SJA1.1b

  (18) Belka boitsja, čto koška

  Belka boitsja, čto koška *sxvati, ?sxvatiša eë detěnyša* ‘The squirrel is afraid that the cat will catch has caught her young one’.
BOJAT´SJA I.1c

(19) Belka boitsja za svoego detenyša : ne sxvatit sxvatila li ego koška

“The squirrel is afraid for her young one: won’t the cat catch him?”.

With human subjects, sentences of the type (18)-(19) are perfectly OK in the past:

(20) Ona boitsja, čto policija sxvatit sxvatila eë syna

“She is afraid that the police will catch her son.”

(21) Ona boitsja za svoego syna : ne sxvatit sxvatila li ego policija

“She is afraid for her son: won’t the police catch him?”.

To account for these facts, in the definition of B. I.1a we used the component ‘expect’, which is applicable to both people and animals, and in B. I.1b, c, the disjunction ‘expect [with respect to the future] or believe to be very likely [with respect to the past or the present]’. The component ‘believe to be very likely’ excludes animals (and very young children).

N: Generally speaking, no Russian emotion verb whose meaning includes the component ‘believe’ takes animal subjects.9 Such is the case, e.g., of UDIVLJAT´SJA ‘to be surprised’, VOZMUšČAT´SJA ‘to be indignant’, STYDIT´SJA ‘to be ashamed’, GORDIT´SJA ‘to be proud’, etc.

To make sure that the senses B. I.1a and B. I.1b cannot be united to produce a complex sense, one may have recourse once again to the Apresjan Criterion:

(22) a. On boitsja [= B. I.1a] prygat´s parašjutom, ‘He is afraid of jumping with a parachute’.

b. Prygaja s parašjutom, on boitsja [= B. I.1b] razbit´sja ‘When jumping with a parachute, he is afraid of killing himself’.

c. ?? On boitsja prygat´s parašjutom i razbit´sja.

[Note that conjoining verbs in two different aspects is possible in Russian: On xočet èkspluatirovat´ [IMPERF] menja i v to Že vremja soxranit´ [PERF] so mnoj xoroshih otnoshenija ‘He wants to exploit me and, at the same time, to remain on excellent terms with me’.]

4) The last division separates BOJAT´SJA I.1b from BOJAT´SJA I.1c.

Something Undesirable [BOJAT´SJA I.1b] vs. Victim of Something Undesirable [BOJAT´SJA I.1c]:

Different semantic actants.

(23) a. On boitsja [= B. I.1b], čto ego syn načnět prinimat´ narkotiki ‘He is afraid that his son will go on drugs’.

vs.

b. On boitsja [= B. I.1c] za syna ‘He is afraid for his son’.

Unlike (23a), the sentence (23b) specifies the ‘victim’ of an undesirable event, which is not specified itself. Thus the second semantic actants of B. I.1b and B. I.1c are different.
NADEJAT’SJA ‘to hope’

NADEJAT’SJA1 (Petja nadejalsja, čto ona uspeet na poezd ‘P. hoped that she would be in time for the train’):
X nadeetsja, čto Y =
‘Wishing the fact Y to take place,
X expects that Y will take place or X believes it very likely that Y has taken or is taking place
or
X is in a pleasant emotional state which is caused by this expectation or belief of X,
this state being such as is usually caused by the expectation of something desirable’.

NADEJAT’SJA2 (Petja nadejalsja na svoi lyŽi, lit. ‘P. hoped that his skis would function well’):
X nadeetsja na Y =
‘Wishing a certain fact to take place,
X believes it very likely that Y will cause this fact’.

NADEJAT’SJA3 (Nadejus’, čto vy pravy ‘I hope you are right’; Vaš syn, nadejus’, vyderžit ěkzamen ‘Your son, I hope, will pass this exam’):
(Ja = X ) nadejus’, (čto) Y =
‘Believing it very likely that the fact Y has taken, is taking or will take place and that Y is desirable for the addressee or X,
the speaker X expresses his pleasure because of Y [— as if X were hoping that Y]’.

As can be easily seen, NADEJAT’SJA is semantically quite close to BOJAT’SJA (cf. psychological experiments reported in Hunt et al. 1958: 150-151, which showed that fear and hope can be alternative responses to the same underdetermined situation). One of its senses [N.1] is antonymous to the corresponding sense of BOJAT’SJA — B.I.1b:

(24) Maša boitsja [= B.I.1b], čto Petja priedet zavtra ‘M. is afraid that P. will come tomorrow’
[P.’s coming is undesirable for M.].

vs.

Maša nadeetsja [= N.1], čto Petja priedet zavtra ‘M. hopes that P. will come tomorrow’
[P.’s coming is desirable for M.].

The two other senses of NADEJAT’SJA [N.2 and 3] are quasi-antonymous to BOJAT’SJA1.1e and 1.2 [one can readily see the divergences from the definitions]:

(25) Petja boitsja [= B.I.1c] za svoi lyŽi ‘P. is worried about his skis’ [= ‘believes it to be very likely that something will happen to his skis, which is undesirable for him’].

vs.

Petja nadeetsja [= N.2] na svoi lyŽi ‘P. counts on his skis’ [= ‘believes it to be very likely that his skis will be OK, which is desirable for him’].

(26) Petja, bojus [= B.1.2], zavtra priedet ‘P., I am afraid, will come tomorrow’
[the speaker believes that P.’s coming is undesirable for the addressee or for himself].

vs.

Petja, nadejus’ [= N.3], zavtra priedet ‘P., I hope, will come tomorrow’
[the speaker believes that P.’s coming is desirable for the addressee or for himself].

However, there is no complete symmetry between the semantic systems of both verbs under consideration. Some oppositions characteristic of BOJAT’SJA are absent from NADEJAT’SJA: ‘psychological state vs. (physical) property’ (since NADEJAT’SJA has no metaphorical sense
corresponding to BOJAT`SJA\textsubscript{I}, as in \textit{Sukno boitsja pyli}, ‘Broadcloth is sensitive to dust’) and the four oppositions between B.I.1a and B.I.1b, c (since NADEJAT`SJA has no correlate for BOJAT`SJA\textsubscript{I}, as in \textit{On boitsja sobak} ‘He is afraid of dogs’). The two remaining oppositions are slightly different in NADEJAT`SJA. Let us consider them.

**Expectation/Belief or Emotion [NADEJAT`SJA 1] vs. No-Emotion [NADEJAT`SJA 2, 3].**

In contrast to BOJAT`SJA\textsubscript{I}, where the emotion component ‘to be in an emotional state ...’ can be the dominant node in all the senses except the non-descriptive one, NADEJAT`SJA has the emotion component only in one sense: N.1. Two other senses — a descriptive and a non-descriptive one — do not contain it (N.3, like B.I.2, does not refer to an emotion but constitutes a speaker’s speech action: expressing an emotion). Thus NADEJAT`SJA is even ‘less emotional’ than BOJAT`SJA, which, as has been stated, is ‘less emotional’ than most Russian emotion verbs.

The division between N.1 and N.2,3 is supported by the same evidence as for the corresponding division in BOJAT`SJA:

- \textbf{Paraphrase Potential.} N.1, but not N.2 and N.3, can be paraphrased using such expressions as \textit{Nadežda} živět v ego serdce, lit. ‘Hope is living in his heart’, where the emotion component is obvious:

  (27) \textit{On vsě ešče nadeeetsja, čto otec priedet} = \textit{Nadežda, čto otec priedet, vsě ešče živět v ego serdce} ‘He is still hoping that Father will come’ = lit. ‘The hope that Father will come is still living in his heart’.

  \textit{vs.}

  \textit{[On vsegda nadejalsja na syna, i. vsě ešče nadeeetsja na nego] = *...èta nadežda vsě ešče živět v ego serdce} ‘[He has always been counting on his son, and] he is still counting [lit.’hoping’] on him son’ = ‘...this hope is still living in his heart’.

  \textit{vs.}

  \textit{Nadejus’, otec priedet} ‘I hope Father will come’ \neq \textit{Nadežda, čto otec priedet, vsě ešče živět v moëm serdce}, lit. ‘The hope that Father will come is still living in my heart’.

- \textbf{Lexical cooccurrence.} In contradistinction to N.2 and N.3, the verb N.1 admits adverbials such as, e.g., \textit{gorjačo <vsem serdcem, ...>}, lit. ‘ardently <with all my heart, ...>’, which obviously characterize the intensity of the emotion:

  (28) \textit{Ja [gorja2co \cqa vsem serdcem \cq, nadejus’, čto otec priedet]},

  \textit{lit. ‘I hope ardently [with all my heart] that Father will come’}.

  \textit{vs.}

  \textit{Ja [gorja2co \*vsem serdcem \*nadejus’ na syna vy polu2cili moë prigla2senie]},

  \textit{lit. ‘I hope ardently [with all my heart] on my son (i.e., I’m pinning my hopes on my son)’}.

- \textbf{Absolutive use.} N.1 admits absolutive use, i.e., it can appear without the second syntactic actant, which is completely impossible for N.2 and N.3:

  (29) \textit{On vsë ešče nadeeetsja} ‘He is still hoping’.

**Something Desirable [NADEJAT`SJA\textsubscript{I}]**
**Causer of Something Desirable** [NADEJAT´SJA 2]:

Different semantic actants.

(30) a. On nadeetsja [= N.1], čto ego syn vsë ustroit ‘He hopes that his son will arrange everything’.

b. On nadeetsja [= N.2] na syna ‘He counts [= lit.’hopes’] on his son’.

Unlike (30a), the sentence (30b) specifies the Causer of an expected desirable event, which itself is not specified. Thus the second semantic actants of N.1 and N.2 are different.

### III

**Semantic Components in the Definitions**

When discussing the semantic components necessary to define BOJAT´SJA and NADEJAT´SJA, we can consider both verbs simultaneously, given their semantic closeness.

1. **Structure of the Definitions for BOJAT´SJA and NADEJAT´SJA.**

To characterize the general organization of the definitions, two points have to be considered: the opposition ‘assertion vs. presupposition’ and the disjunction ‘emotional state caused by expectation or (a mere) expectation’.

- **Assertion vs. Presupposition**

As indicated above, the definitions of BOJAT´SJA I.1b, c and NADEJAT´SJA 1, 2 consist of two parts: a presupposition and an assertion. The respective presuppositions are antonymous: for B.I.1b, c, the presupposition is ‘wishing the fact Y not to take place’, and for N.1, 2, ‘wishing the fact Y to take place’. For B.I.1b we have already demonstrated the presuppositional character of the undesirability of the fact Y: in (10) the undesirability remains outside the scope of negation; let us now illustrate the same for N.1 and 2. The sentence (31):

(31) Tanja ne nadejalas´ [= N.1] zastat´ otca v živyx ‘T. held no hope of seeing Father alive’.

negates only Tanya’s belief that Father’s being alive is likely; it still maintains the desirability of this state of affairs for Tanya. In (32):

(32) Tanja ne nadejalas´ [= N.2] na svoi lyži ‘T. did not trust her skis’.

negation does not affect the desirability for T. of the situation ‘her skis function properly’.

Interestingly, it is the presuppositional / assertional character of the desirability component that opposes Russian NADEJAT´SJA1 and the semantically quasi-equivalent German HOFFEN (Iordanskaja 1986: 366). In German, HOFFEN admits the Neg-Transportation; in (33a):

(33) a. Germ. Ich hoffe, daß Ihr Sohn **nicht** krank ist. ‘I hope that your son isn’t ill’ =
    = Ich hoffe **nicht**, daß Ihr Sohn krank ist [the same],

both sentences are roughly equivalent, i.e., both signal the desirability for me of the fact ‘your son isn’t ill’.

This proves that in HOFFEN the desirability component is not part of the presupposition, because if this were so, it would preclude the Neg-Transportation, as it does in Russian:

b. Ja nadejus´, čto vaš syn **ne** bolen ‘I hope that your son isn’t ill’ ≠
    ≠ Ja **ne** nadejus´, čto vaš syn bolen ‘I don’t hope that your son is ill’,
the second sentence in (33b) signalling, as in English, the desirability for me of the fact ‘your son is ill’. The desirability component in the presupposition of NADEJAT’SJA cannot be negated by general negation of the verb and ‘stands out’, making the sentence in question sound bizarre. 11

• The Disjunction ‘Emotional State Caused by Expectation or (a Mere) Expectation’

The said disjunction appears in the three BOJAT’SJA1.1 and in NADEJAT’SJA1. Thus, B.1.1a can be used to mean:
— EITHER a specific emotional state (or the property of being in such a state) caused by X’s expectation,
— OR this expectation only.

In sentence (34), bojus’ ‘I’m afraid’ does not necessarily imply a ‘fearful’ emotion:

(34) Net, ja ètogo lekarstva ne znaju i bojus’ ego; primu už lučše aspirin! ‘No, I am not familiar with this medicine and I’m afraid of it; better take an aspirin!’;

in sentence (35) it rather does:

(35) Net, ja bezumno bojus’ ètoj operacii i ne soglašus’ na neè ‘No, I’m terribly afraid of this operation [= I fear it] and won’t agree to it’.

In many cases it is far from obvious whether the speaker really means the fearful emotion or not; by using the disjunction in question, we render the corresponding senses of the verbs vague enough to cover all possible uses.

The Apresjan Criterion indicates that both parts of the disjunction must remain within the same sense (= in the same definition):

(36) Ja bojus’ ètogo lekarstva, no eščë bol’še — operacii ‘I’m scared of this medicine but even more so, of the operation’.

Sentence (36) is perfectly grammatical and does not contain a pun.

Note that the actual linear arrangement of the members of the disjunction in question (first, the evaluation and then, the emotion) is LOGICALLY irrelevant: it does not presuppose any hierarchy between them, but simply ensures a shorter formulation.

2. The Emotion Component.

The proposed way of referring to the emotional state in the definitions of emotion words within a strictly semantic approach calls for the following six comments.

1) The linguistic meaning corresponding to each emotional state E of X with respect to Y is characterized along TWO DIMENSIONS: ‘PLEASANTNESS’ (E is pleasant/unpleasant for X) and ‘INTENSITY’ (E is intense/moderate). This is in accord with modern psychology, where the same two dimensions, or scales, are used to characterize emotions, although under different names: since Osgood et al. 1957 they are known as ‘valence’ (good/bad) and ‘strength’ (strong/weak); cf., in particular, Davitz 1964: 105. 12

The said dimensions are not all necessarily relevant for each E. Thus, for BOJAT’SJA ‘intensity’ is irrelevant: one can bojat’sja both užasno ‘terribly’ and čut’-čut’ ‘a little bit’; for UDIV-LJAT’(SJA) to surprise (be surprised) both ‘intensity’ and ‘pleasantness’ are irrelevant: one can udivit’sja ‘to be surprised’ sil’no ‘strongly’ or slekga ‘slightly’, as well as one can udivit’ ‘to surprise’ prijatno ‘pleasantly’ or neprijatno ‘unpleasantly’.
The components ‘pleasant’/’unpleasant’ and ‘intense’/’moderate’ are present in the definitions of emotion words not because they reflect some psychological reality (which they of course do) but for strictly linguistic reasons. (This is in fact the well-known Principle of linguistic relevance; see, e.g., Apresjan 1969: 23 and Wierzbicka 1985: 197 ff.) Namely, these components, as definitional components in general, must be justified by paradigmatic or syntagmatic considerations.

On the one hand, the components in question might be necessary to oppose different emotion words paradigmatically. For instance, izumlenie ≠ ’amazement’ differs from udivlenie ’surprise’ only as being ‘intense and not unpleasant’ (izumlenie is an ‘intense and not unpleasant surprise’).

On the other hand, these components ensure correct syntagmatic cooccurrence. For instance, only for an ‘intense’ emotion can you say that it oxvatyvaet ‘seizes’ X, that X is vo vlasti ‘in the power’ of this emotion, etc.; an ‘intense’ emotion verb does not admit slegka ‘slightly’, and ‘pleasant’ emotion words are incompatible with modifiers meaning ‘unpleasant’ (*neprijatnaja radost ‘unpleasant joy’); and so forth.

2) But, however important the above components might be, they are by no means sufficient for specifying the meaning of the corresponding emotion word completely: what is needed is having recourse to the evaluation by X OF THE SITUATION triggering the emotion. This fact has been repeatedly emphasized in psychology, since Descartes: see, e.g., Hunt et al. 1958, Schachter 1971: 4 and Davitz 1964;13 R. Solomon (1980) stated it in a paradoxical form: ‘Against the near-platitude ‘Emotions are irrational’, we want to argue that emotions are rational <...>. Emotions <...> are rash judgements, something I do but in haste (p. 262).’ In linguistic semantics, the use of evaluative components for the description of emotion words was put forth and elaborated in Wierzbicka 1971, 1972 and Iordanskaja 1970.

For BOJAT´SJA and NADEJAT´SJA the evaluative components are, roughly speaking, the expectation of something undesirable vs. the expectation of something desirable.

3) This evaluation (= interpretation, appraisal, conceptualization) of the situation by X is the ‘normal’ condition for the emergence of the emotional state E. Yet this condition does not guarantee this emotional state in ALL conceivable situations for ALL beings: it is not a sufficient condition (cf. ‘emotion-blind people’). Strictly speaking, it is not even a necessary condition: some emotions are possible without a rational evaluation of the situation (cf. groundless fear or I feel sad but I don’t know why; this caused some to believe that certain emotion words cannot be semantically analyzed at all: e.g., Johnson-Laird and Oatley 1989: 89-95). As a consequence, we need a further component, relativizing the description of the emotion with respect to the prototypical situation of its emergence: ‘this state is such as is usually caused by similar evaluations’. This component is proposed for the definitions of all emotion words (Iordanskaja 1970, Wierzbicka 1970, 1971) and, in particular, it is included in the definitions of BOJAT´SJA and NADEJAT´SJA. Note that several psychologists are fully aware of this relative character of the description of emotions: ‘Our claims about the structure of individual emotions are always along the lines that if an individual conceptualizes a situation in a certain kind of way, then the
POTENTIAL [emphasis is ours.—L.I., I.M.] for a particular type of emotion exists’ (Ortony et al. 1988: 2).

An important subtlety in the definitions of BOJAT’SJA1.a, b and c should be emphasized. In the evaluation part we speak of ‘expecting something undesirable’, while in the part stating the prototypical situation for the emotion the expression ‘expecting something dangerous’ is used. This is done in order to account for the fact that the emotion of BOJAT’SJA is prototypically entailed by danger (roughly speaking, it is the emotion you are supposed to experience when facing an imminent danger). Yet the verb can be used to describe an undesirable situation where no actual danger is implied but the emotion experienced is said to be similar — as if the ‘something undesirable’ of the situation were a danger. One can say Ja bojus’ skučnyx sobranij ‘I am scared of boring meetings’, without pretending that there is a real danger; one says, nevertheless, that one experiences an emotion such as one would facing a danger. (Note that the undesirability of Y is itself insufficient to specify ‘fear’: it can provoke disgust, being upset, irritation, etc.) Similar divergences between an actual and a prototypical situation are possible in the definitions of other emotion words. This is our way of allowing for the ‘stretching’ of emotion words to deal with the problem of semantic oscillation, see The Data subsection in the Introduction.

4) For several emotion words, the definition must include a component specifying the typical behaviour of X as the consequence of the emotional state E. In all emotion senses of BOJAT’SJA this component is ‘[expectation/belief or emotional state which] cause X to tend to avoid Y’. Its presence is linguistically supported, in particular, by the existence of the verb POBOJAT’SJA: X pobojalsja Y-it’ ≠ ‘X did not Y because X was afraid to Y’ (Ivan pobojalsja prygnut’ ≠ ‘I. did not jump because I. was afraid to jump’). Pobojat’sja is a lexical function of bojat’sja; namely, it is its Real: metaphorically speaking, it denotes the fulfillment of the ‘requirement’ of bojat’sja, in this case, the avoidance of Y (pobojat’sja is to bojat’sja what carry out [instructions] is to instruct or follow [the advice] to advise). The component ‘to tend to avoid Y’ in the definitions of all the senses of BOJAT’SJA1.1 explains the presence of this lexical function.

5) Iordanskaja 1970: 23 proposed including the component ‘X believes that X cannot cause the undesirable event not to happen’ in the definition of BOJAT’SJA. However, at present we find this component redundant (and consequently have dropped it); it follows from ‘X expects that Y will do X something undesirable / an undesirable Y will take place’ — and not ‘... Y can do X something undesirable/an undesirable Y can take place’. In our definitions of all the emotional senses of BOJAT’SJA the undesirable event (related to) Y is specified not as a potential danger but as an actual evil; and if someone thinks that an undesirable Y will happen to him this implies that he believes he is unable to do anything about it.

6) In the definitions of both verbs being considered we did not use the corresponding nouns, although for different reasons.

As far as BOJAT’SJA1 is concerned, Russian has no name to refer to the relevant emotional state. STRAX ≠ ‘fear’ and BOJAZN’ ≠ ‘anxiety’ are more specific than BOJAT’SJA. STRAX
includes high intensity and a tendency to lose self-control, both absent from BOJAT`SJA: nemnogo boitsja `is slightly afraid’ vs. *nebol`šøj<slabyj, ...>strax `slight<weak,...>fear’. BOJAZN’, on the contrary, includes low intensity: dikoj boitsja, lit.`is wildly afraid’ vs. *dikaja bojazn’, lit.`wild anxiety’; cf. also *bojazn’ prizn  ‘fear of death’ [correct: strax smerti `fear of death’]. What is even more important, BOJAZN’ implies exclusively an emotional property: bojazn’ novyj ljudej ‘fear of new people’ vs *bojazn’ etix ljudej `fear of these people’, while BOJAT`SJA.I.1 can refer to an actual emotional state. Therefore, BOJAT`SJA.I.1 cannot be defined in terms of STRAX or BOJAZN’.

With NADEJAT`SJA.I, it would be possible to define it as ‘to be in the state of NADEŽDÁ1’, since NADEŽDÁ1[the] hope’ has exactly the same meaning as NADEJAT`SJA.I. Yet in this case, as in many others, we follow the convention that a deverbal noun identical in meaning with the respective verb must be defined via this verb, and not vice versa. This guarantees a better coherence of the whole system (NADEŽDÁ1 is described in terms of NADEJAT`SJA.I just as STRAX and BOJAZN’ are described in terms of BOJAT`SJA.I.1) and allows us to avoid empty words in the definitions (like ‘to be in’ in ‘to be in the state of ...’).

The above analysis leads to a DEFINITION SCHEME for all emotion senses:

**Presupposition:** ...

**Assertion:**

**Evaluation** (of the actual situation by X): ...

**Emotion** (of X):

**Characterization** (in terms of relevant dimensions): ...

**Cause (= actual conditions)**: ...

**Prototypical conditions**: ...

**Effect** (of the emotion of X on X): ...

This is of course a maximal scheme; in particular definitions, the Presupposition and the Effect components may be absent.

This scheme could be used in the dictionary definitions: namely, we could supply headings for the major components of a definition such that they would indicate, in an explicit way, its general structure: see, e.g., the definition of BOJAT`SJA.I.1a rewritten with headings:

**B.I.1a. X boitsja Y-a ‘X is afraid of Y’**

**Assertion**

**Evaluation**

‘X expects that Y will cause something undesirable for X or

**Emotion**

X is or has the property of being in

**Characterization**

an unpleasant emotional state with respect to Y

**Cause**

which is caused by said X’s expectation ,

**Prototyp. conditions**

this state being such as is usually caused by the expectation of something dangerous,

**Effect**

this expectation and/or state causing X to tend to avoid Y’.

Since we are not sure whether this innovation is really welcome, we did not use such a presentation in the lexical entries in this paper. It seems preferable to give such a general scheme not for every individual entry, but for a whole semantic field — in the entry for its generic lexical unit (in our case, under EMOTION) as a METAsemantic statement.

Consider the following sentences:

(37) Petja očen\'} \{radovalsja
\{serdilsja
\{udivljalsja
\{ogor2calsja\}, čto Maša uže v gorode

‘P. was very \{happy
angry
surprised
upset\} that M. was already in town’.

(38) Petja očen\'} \{bojalsja
\{nadejalsja\}, čto Maša uže v gorode

‘P. was very \{afraid
hopeful\} that M. was already in town’.

The four verbs in (37) are typical representatives of the four main semantic groups of Russian emotion words: ‘RADOST’‘joy’, ‘GNEV’‘anger’, ‘UDIVLENIE’‘surprise’ and ‘OGORčENIE’ ‘being upset’ (Iordanskaja 1970). In all of them the speaker seems to imply the factual truth of the proposition ‘Y’ expressed by their second syntactic (sentential) actant: in (37), the fact ‘Masha is already in town’ must, from the viewpoint of the speaker, have taken place. These and all the other emotion verbs in the above-mentioned groups manifest a semantic property which obviously should be characterized from the viewpoint of factivity (Kiparsky and Kiparsky 1970). Padučeva 1985: 70 (with a reference to F.Kiefer) calls the emotion verbs of this type factive — having specified, however, that what is presupposed by them is the certainty of the subject of the emotion in Y rather than the factual truth of Y.

In contrast to the above verbs, BOJAT´SJA and NADEJAT´SJA, which represent the two remaining semantic groups of Russian emotion words, do not imply the truth of the proposition in question: in (38), the fact ‘Masha is already in town’ need not have actually taken place, since not even the subject of the emotion is quite certain of this. Thus, these verbs are by no means factive.

However, things are more complicated than this. First of all, the verb RADOVAT´SJA should not be called factive either — at least, not in the same sense as the typical factive verb ZNAT´‘to know’:

(39) a. Petja znaet, čto Maša uže v gorode, *a na samom dele, eë tam net ‘P. knows that M. is already in town while in point of fact she isn’t there’ [here, as well as in (40), the asterisk indicates the unacceptability of this continuation].

vs.

b. Petja raduetsja, čto Maša uže v gorode, a na samom dele, eë tam net ‘P. feels happy that M. is already in town while in point of fact she isn’t there’.

Because of (39b), we cannot simply include a presupposition of factivity, i.e., the component ‘Y having taken, taking or going to take place’ (which is necessary in ZNAT´ and other really factive words) in the definition of RADOVAT´SJA. Nevertheless, this verb somehow seems to imply — when not in a contradicting context! — the truth of Y. To solve this contradiction, we
propose that what it does actually imply is a HIGH LIKELIHOOD of Y being true — from the viewpoint of the speaker. We express this by including a presupposition of ‘quasi-factivity’ in the definition of RADOVAT’´SJA: ‘Y being very likely to have taken, to be taking or to take place’; accordingly, this verb could be called quasi-factive. The quasi-factivity component is of course absent from the definitions of both BOJAT’´SJA and NADEJAT´SJA. This does not contradict the presence (in these verbs) of the component of high expectation: ‘X believes it to be very likely that Y’ expresses the belief of the subject of the emotion, while the presupposition of the likelihood of Y in quasi-factive verbs expresses the belief of the speaker.

Quasi-factivity is what is currently called a weak or unstable semantic component: it can easily be ‘extinguished’ in an explicitly contradicting context; that is what happens in (39b). For more on unstable semantic components, see Apresjan 1979: 514 and Zaliznjak 1987. Cf. also Shrage 1981, who considers emotion verbs such as resent and regret to be non factive. She explains their factive interpretation (when not in a contradicting context) by their purely PRAGMATIC presuppositions, while she believes that genuine factivity is linked to a corresponding SEMANTIC presupposition.

4. The ‘Expectation’ Component.

The verbs of the above-mentioned four groups denote emotions of X arising as X’s reactions to the fact Y of whose taking place X is quite certain (reactions to certainty). Once again, unlike these, BOJAT’´SJA and NADEJAT´SJA denote emotions of X arising as X’s reactions to Y which X is only expecting (reactions to expectation). Therefore, (40) sounds bizarre, while (41) is OK:

(40) Petja \begin{itemize}
\item radovalja
\item serdilsja
\item udivljajslja
\item ogorsalsja
\end{itemize}
\begin{itemize}
\item {čto Maša uže v gorode, * xotja i ne byl v ètom uveren}
\item that M. was already in town, although he wasn’t sure of this’.
\end{itemize}

(41) Petja \begin{itemize}
\item bojalja
\item nadejalsja
\item scared
\item hopeful
\end{itemize}
\begin{itemize}
\item {čto Maša uže v gorode, xotja i ne byl v ètom uveren}
\item that M. was already in town, although he wasn’t sure of this’.
\end{itemize}

Reactions to certainty are of course more emotional than those to mere expectation; as was stated above (p. 5), BOJAT’´SJA and NADEJAT´SJA are only weakly emotional: they are closer to ‘mental predicates’ than RADOVAT´SJA-type genuine emotion verbs.

An interesting manifestation of this distinction is that the genuine emotion verbs can all introduce direct speech, while BOJAT´SJA and NADEJAT´SJA, like other mental predicates (e.g., SčITAT´-2 ‘to believe’, POLAGAT´ ‘to believe’ etc.), cannot (Iordanskaja and Mel’čuk 1981):
(42) ‘Značit, Maša uže v gorode!’ — 
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{radovalsja} & \quad \text{Petja,} \\
\text{serdilsja} & \\
\text{udviljalsja} & \\
\text{ogor2calsja} & \\
\end{align*}
\]

lit.’’This means that M. is already in town!’ — P. was \{happy, angry, surprised, upset\}.

(43) ‘A vdrug Maša uževa gorode!’ — 
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{*bojalsja} & \quad \text{Petja}, \\
\text{*nadejalsja} & \\
\end{align*}
\]

lit. ‘‘And what if M. is already in town!’ — P. was \{afraid, hopeful\}.

Accordingly, the definitions of all the ‘emotional’ senses of BOJAT´SJA and NADEJAT´SJA (B.1a,b,c and N.1) contain the component ‘X expects that ...’ or ‘X believes it to be very likely that ...’, rather than ‘X is certain that ...’.

The ‘expect’ component can co-exist, in the definition of an emotion verb, with the ‘be certain’ component, these two components referring of course to two different events. For instance, ISPUGAT´SJA ‘to get scared’ is such a verb:

\[
X \text{ispugalsja} Y-a =
\]

‘X got into an emotional state unpleasant for X which is caused by the following:

X IS CERTAIN that the event Y or the event entailed by Y is taking, took or is to take place,

this event being very likely to have taken, to be taking or to take place,

and X EXPECTS that this event will cause something undesirable to happen to X;

this state is such as is usually caused by the expectation of something dangerous’.

On the other hand, the component ‘X expects ...’ in the definitions of BOJAT´SJA and NADEJAT´SJA — in contradistinction to ‘X believes ...’ — is necessary to account for possible animal subjects, see above, p. 00, after (21).

5. The Speaker’s ‘Speech Action’ Component.

In two preceding subsections we have pointed out two properties that distinguish BOJAT´SJA and NADEJAT´SJA from other Russian emotion verbs: non-factivity and the ‘expectation / belief’ component. Now we will indicate a further interesting distinction: unlike other emotion verbs, these two have non-descriptive senses: BOJAT´SJA\textsubscript{1.2} and NADEJAT´SJA\textsubscript{3}.

A non-descriptive lexical item does not describe the fact it mentions: uttering a non-descriptive item constitutes PERFORMING a ‘speech action’. Non-descriptive items include, in particular, the well-known performatives and what we call expressives. (Note that this use of the term expressive does not correspond to that in Searle and Vanderveken 1985: 211 ff.) Uttering a performative is, by definition, DOING what this performative names (by saying I promise I promise); uttering an expressive is by no means doing what this expressive names but EXPRESSING it (by saying I’m sorry I am not being sorry but I express my being sorry). Expressives are, so to speak, ‘linguistic gestures’, institutionalized in a given language-culture continuum. Typical examples of expressives are Glad to see you!, Sorry!, Drop dead! etc. in English, or else Razrešite!,
lit. ‘Allow [me]!’, in Russian (said, e.g., by someone who is pushing past you in a crowd and does not wait for your permission at all). BOJAT’SJA1.2 and NADEJAT’SJA3 are also expressives.

The ‘expressiveness’ of BOJAT’SJA1.2 and NADEJAT’SJA3 is rendered by the use of the component ‘the speaker expresses …’ as a dominant component in the definition; in bojus’, the speaker expresses his being upset because of an undesirable fact, and in nadejus´, his being pleased with a desirable fact.

As all the expressives, BOJAT’SJA1.2 and NADEJAT’SJA3 contrast with the performatives (such as to SWEAR, to PROMISE, to CONGRATULATE) in that the expressiveness is part of their LEXICAL meaning while the performativeness is not part of the lexical meaning of a performative. In the definition of an expressive, X [= the subject of the fact mentioned] is ALWAYS the speaker, which is not the case for the performatives: in their definitions, X is NEVER the speaker; X can become the speaker only in the 1sg present indicative. Therefore, BOJAT’SJA1.2 and NADEJAT’SJA3 only have the forms of the 1st person: 1sg present indicative for BOJAT’SJA1.2 and 1sg present indicative /1st pl imperative for NADEJAT´SJA3. Unlike them, the performatives have, along with the form of 1sg present for the performative use, all the other forms — for descriptive uses.

Like performatives (in performative use), BOJAT’SJA1.2 and NADEJAT’SJA3 cannot be negated (see the corresponding entries, p. 00) and do not take modifiers: 18

(44) Ja * davno <tak, paničeski, ...> bojus’, čto vaš uvažaemyj opponent prav ‘I have been afraid for a long time <I am so<hysterically, ...>afraid> that your honourable opponent may be right’.

[Sentence (44) is grammatical on a different reading, with bojus´ = BOJAT´SJA I.1b.]

Note that besides the above-mentioned properties common to both verbs, BOJAT´SJA1.2 and NADEJAT´SJA3 show an interesting difference: BOJAT´SJA1.2 cannot be used in a question while NADEJAT´SJA3 can; cf.:

(45) a. Vaš syis, * bojus´, uže uexal? ‘Did your son, I’m afraid, already leave?’

vs.

b. Vaš syis, nadejus´, uže uexal? ‘Did your son, I hope, already leave?’

The impossibility of (45a) can be explained as follows: In bojus´1.2, the speaker is certain of the fact Y taking place, and it is absurd to question one’s own certainty; but in nadejus´3, he only believes Y to be very likely, and therefore the question concerning Y is possible. (Cf. a discussion of the pair bojus´ s nadejus in the parenthetical use in Padučeva and Zaliznjak 1987: 90-91, where a different explanation of the impossibility (45a) is proposed.)

IV

Conclusion

As the preceding analysis shows, BOJAT´SJA and NADEJAT´SJA occupy a special place among Russian emotion verbs. To sum up what has been said so far, we would like to emphasize here the differences between these two verbs and ‘purely emotional’ verbs, such as RADOVAT´SJA’to be happy’, OGORČAT´SJA’to be upset’, SERDIT´SJA’to be angry’,
UDIVLJAT`SJA`to be surprised`, etc. Unlike the latter, B. and N. feature the following five characteristics.

1) B. and N. express the disjunction `expectation/belief or emotion`, i.e., they can be used indiscriminately to cover either the situation of an actual emotional state or that of a mere expectation. Thus they are weakly emotional — intermediate between purely emotional and mental verbs. (Moreover, NADEJAT`SJA is even less emotional than BOJAT`SJA: see p. 00.)

2) B. and N. have `expectation /belief` as the dominant component (in some senses, as one of the two dominant components: `expectation/belief or emotion`). The `belief` component can also appear in certain purely emotional verbs — but never as a dominant one. Thus, VOZMUšČAT`SJA `to be indignant`, STYDIT`SJA `to be ashamed` and GORDIT`SJA `to be proud` obviously imply a judgment, which is, however, subordinated to the emotional component.

3) B. and N. raise the problem assertion vs. presupposition: several of their senses include nontrivial presuppositions (thus, B.1.la and B.1.lb are even opposed along these lines). It seems (pending a special investigation) that other emotion verbs do not show a similar distinction.

4) B. and N. lack the presupposition of factivity or quasi-factivity typical of purely emotional verbs. This is explained by the fact that in purely emotional verbs, X`s judgement on the existence of Y is certainty, while in B. and N. it is no more than expectation or belief. The speaker has the tendency to share, at least, to some extent, the certainty of X, while he would be much less inclined to share simple expectation or belief. Hence the (quasi-)factivity of purely emotional verbs and its absence from B. and N.

5) B. and N. both have non-descriptive (more precisely, expressive) senses. Interestingly, such verbs as RADOVAT`SJA `to be happy / glad` or OGORčAT`SJA `to be upset / sorry`, which semantically could have expressive uses as well, do not have them:

   (46) a. On, *(ja) radujus`, pridèt, lit. `He, I`m glad, is coming`.

   b. On, *(ja) ogorčajus`, ne pridèt, lit. `He, I`m sorry, isn`t coming`.

This could probably be related to the fact that B. and N. are not purely emotional verbs.

V

Lexical Entries for BOJAT`SJA and NADEJAT`SJA

In the entries below we use the standard format of the Explanatory Combinatorial Dictionary (ECD), assuming the reader`s familiarity with it. (In case of necessity, one may consult Mel`čuk and Žolkovskij 1984, Mel`čuk et al. 1984, 1988.)

BOJÁT`SJA, júš`, játšja, reflexivum tantum; no perfective aspect.

I.1.a. X boitsja Y-a =
   X ožidaet, četo Y skauziruet nečto neželatel`noe dlja X-a, 
   ili
   X naxoditsja ili imeet svojstvo naxodit`sja v neprijatnom èmocional`nom sostojanii, 
   napravlennom na Y, kotoroe kauzirovano ukazannym ožidaniem X-a ;
   četo sostojanie — takoe, kakoe obyčno kauziruetja ožidaniem opasnogo;
ëto ožidanje i/ili èto sostojanie kauzirujut u X-a stremlenie izbegat’ Y
‘X expects that Y will cause something undesirable for X
or
X is or has the property of being in an unpleasant emotional state with respect to Y,
which is caused by said X’s expectation,
this state being such as is usually caused by the expectation of something dangerous,
this expectation and/or emotional state causing X to tend to avoid Y’.

**Government Pattern**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>X = I</th>
<th>Y = II</th>
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</table>
| 1. N
nom       | 1. N acc       |
|              | 2. N gen       |
|              | 3. V
inf        |
|              | 4. coll. (togo ) \, \, òto
CLAUSE pres |
|              | 5. coll. \, çtoby
CLAUSE |
|              | 6. kogda
CLAUSE
imperf      |

1) C
II.1 : ‘... that a being Y will cause something undesirable for X, X undergoing actual
direct contact with Y’; Y denotes a being and is specific and referential [see footnote 6].
2) C
II.4 : Y is specific and referential.
3) C
II.5 : the main verb of the CLAUSE in the perfective is Undesirable; many speakers
avoid the construction with òtoby altogether.
4) C
II.6 : Y is generic; the tense of the verb in the kogda - clause must be the same as
that of the main clause.

On javnym obrazom bojalsja ‘He was obviously afraid’.
Ja bojus’ tvou sestru ‘I am afraid of your sister’.
Belka ne podejdet, ona boitsja sobaku <sobaki >‘The squirrel won’t approach: he is afraid of
the dog’.
Vasja boitsja temnoty <Ženskix slëz, priezda otcay ‘V. is afraid of the dark<of women’s tears,
of Father’s arrival>’.
Lošad’ boitsja idti po sxodnjam ‘The horse is afraid to walk on the gangplank’.
Babuška boitsja otpuskat’<<otpustit’ >devočku v školu odnu ‘Granny is afraid of letting the girl
go to school alone’.
— Vidiš’, belka boitsja, çto my podxodim! ‘— You see, the squirrel is afraid of us
approaching!’
Mat’ boitsja, òtoby on ezdil verzom ‘Mother is apprehensive at the thought of him riding ‘.
Mat’ boitsja, kogda ty ezdiš’ verzom ‘Mother is afraid when you go riding’.

Undesirable: * Mat’ boitsja , òtoby on poexal tuda verzom ‘Mother is apprehensive at the
thought of him riding there’ (Restr. 3) [correct: ...òtoby on exal tuda verzom].
Impossible: * Ja bojus’ ètoto poezd ‘I am afraid of this train’ (Restr.1) [correct: ...
poezda];
* Belki obyčno bojatsja, òto k nim podxodiat ‘Squirrels are as a rule afraid that
people approach them’ (Restr. 2) [correct: ...kogda k nim podxodiat ];
* Ja bojal’sja, kogda ty pojdiš’ tuda odin ‘I was afraid when you would go there
alone’ (Restr. 4) [correct: ...
kogda ty xodil tuda odin ].
Lexical Functions

**Syn**
- infm. trusit’, obsol. trusa prazdnovat’; liter. strašit’ja; ne smet’;
- robet’, coll. dreifit’; drožat’ II.1 < coll. trjastis’ II.1; liter. trepetat’ II
- [pered N]; opasat’jja

**Anti**
- ljubit’

**Conv**
- pugat’ II [Menja pugat predstojasčij razgovor = Ja bojus’ predstojasčego razgovora]

**Conv**
- liter. strašit’

**S**
- (byt’) strašno I, coll. obsol. (byt’) bojazno

**S**
- bojazn’; strax

**Able**
- bojazlivyj

**Able**
- robkij

**AntiAble**
- besstrašnyj, smelyj, xrabryj

**a fact**
- -S I PredAble

**Magn**
- očen’ < (liter.) paničeski, coll. bezumno, coll. diko, coll. Žutko,
- coll. strašno2, coll. užasno; smertel’no; coll. kak ognja, book. kak
- čert ladana | C II = N, generic [*On boitsja ezdit’ tuda kak ognja

- vs. On boitsja poezdok tuda kak ognja ]; coll. kak čumy | C II = N,
- generic, preferably is 9ETO or denotes an event

**AntiMagn**
- // pobaivat’sja

**PerfIncep**
- // ispugat’sjaa, substand. zaboja’ja

**Caus**
- // pugat’ I [On ljubit’ pugat’ malen’kix ]; liter. ustrašat’

**PerfReal**
- // poboja’jjaa [Ja poboja’lsja predstojasčego razgovora i ne pošel k nemu

When you set out to do something important,
you shouldn’t be afraid of certain risks involved

in this: // Volkov boja’j’ja — v les ne xodit’ [proverb]

Examples

On nikogda ne boitsja ‘He is never afraid’. Nepravda, čto ja bojus’ temnoty, odnako, že i ljubit’ ee
ne imeju dostatočnych osnovani ‘It is not true that I’m afraid of the dark but I don’t have sufficient
reason to like it’ [S. Sokolov]. No bojsja edinstvenno tol’ko togo, / Kto skažet: Ja znaju, kak
nado!’ ‘But be afraid only of him who says: ‘I know how everything should be done!’’ [A.Galič].
Voz’ mi, baraban i ne bojsja, / Celui markitantku zvučnej!’ ‘Take your drum and don’t be afraid, Kiss
the camp follower with more noise!’ [H.Heine, transl. by A. Pleščeev]. ‘Kakaja gluš’, — skazala
Lida, — ja by, znaes’; bojalas’ ostat’sja zdes’ odna. Tut mogut ograbijt’, ubijt’, vsë, čto ugodno [V.
Nabokov] ‘What a deserted area,— Lida said,— I would be afraid, you know, to remain here alone.
You can be robbed, killed, anything’. Ne sleduet boja’j’ja prošlošogo ‘One shouldn’t be afraid of
the past’.
Phrasemes

Boga ne bojat’sja
Pobojsja Boga!
Ne bojsja gostja sidjačega, a bojsja gostja stojačega

I.1b. X boitsja, čto Y = 
Želaja, čtoby ne imel mesta fakt Y,
X ožidaet, čto Y budet imet’ mesto, ili sčitaet² vysokoverojatnym, čto Y imel ili imeet mesto, ili
X naxoditsja v neprijatnom èmocional’nom sostojanii, napravленном на Y, kotoroe kauziro-
vo ne ožidaniem ili mneniem X-a;
èto sostojanie — takoe, kakoe obyчno kauziruetsja ožidaniem opasnogo;
èto ožidanie, mnenie i ili sostojanie kauzirujut u X-a stremlenie izбегat’ Y-a.

‘Wishing the fact Y not to take place,
X expects that Y will take place or believes it very likely that Y has taken or is taking place
or
X is in an unpleasant emotional state with respect to Y, which is caused by said X’s expectation or belief,
this state being such as is usually caused by the expectation of something dangerous,
this expectation, belief or state causing X to tend to avoid Y’.

Government Pattern

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<td>1. N gen</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. V inf,perf</td>
<td>2. V inf,perf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. coll. kak by ... ne V inf, perf</td>
<td>3. coll. kak by ... ne V inf, perf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. (togo ), čto CLAUSE</td>
<td>4. (togo ), čto CLAUSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. čtoby ... ne CLAUSE perf</td>
<td>5. čtoby ... ne CLAUSE perf</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. kak by ... ne CLAUSE perf</td>
<td>6. kak by ... ne CLAUSE perf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. ne ... li CLAUSE perf</td>
<td>7. ne ... li CLAUSE perf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. ne ... by CLAUSE perf</td>
<td>8. ne ... by CLAUSE perf</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1) C_{II.2,II.5,II.8} : ‘X ožidaet, čto Y budet imet’ mesto = X expects that Y will take place’
2) C_{II.3,II.5 - II.8} : B. is not negated.¹⁹

Petja boitsja ‘P. is afraid’[čego? — Da čto sobaka ego ukusit! ‘Of what? — Well, being bitten
by the dog! ‘].
On boitsja avariì ‘He is afraid of an accident’.
On boitsja popast’ v avariì ‘He is afraid of having an accident’<=...kak by ne popast’ v
avariì, lit. ‘... lest he will have an accident’,...(togo ), čto popadët v avariì ‘... that he
will have an accident’.
Bojus’, čtoby <= kak by > ona ne poexala verxom <=...ne poexala by ona verxom >
‘I am afraid that she might go for a ride’.
Petja bojalsja , ne poexala li ona verxom ‘P. was afraid she might have gone for a ride’.
Impossible:
*Ja bojus$ v2cera upast$ 'I am afraid to have fallen yesterday'  
*Ja bojus$, 2ctoby ona v2cera ne upala 'I am afraid that she fell yesterday'  
*Ja bojus$, ne upala by ona v2cera 'I am afraid lest she fell yesterday'

(Restr. 1)

(Restr. 2)

Syntactic Properties
1) B.1.1b does not admit the ellipsis of its complement clause in a dialogue when the whole construction is used as a POSITIVE answer to a preceding question:
— Otec priedet zavtra? — *(Ja ) bojus' <= *(Ja ) bojus' , čto da >.

N: NADEJAT'SJA1, antonymous to B.1.1b, easily admits such an ellipsis:
— Otec priedet zavtra? — *(Ja ) nadejus', čto da >.

Lexical Functions

| Syn_i | : opasat'sja2 |
| Anti | : nadejat'sja1 |
| Conv_{ø21p} | : (byt') strašno^{1}_2 |
| S_{0p} | : bojaz'n'; strax1 |
| Magn | : očen'<(liter.) paničeshki, coll. bezumno, coll. diko, coll. žutko, coll. strašno^2, coll. užasno; smertel'no // coll. drožat'II.1 < coll. trjastis'II.1 |
| PerfIncep_p | : // ispugat'sjab |
| PerfReal_{1['izbegat']} | : // pobojet'sjab [Ja pobbyalsja togo, čto menja uznajut, i ne pošel k nemu ] |

Examples
Ja ne bojus' [= B.1.1b] umeret', ja bojus' [= B.1.1a] umirat' 'I'm not afraid of death, I'm afraid of dying'.

I.1c, X boitsja za Z-a =
X boitsja 1.1b, čto s Z-om slučitsja ili slučilos' sobytie, neželatel'noe dlja X-a. 20 'X is afraid [= B.1.1b] that Z will undergo or has undergone an event undesirable for X'.

Government Pattern

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>X = I</th>
<th>Z = II</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. N' nom</td>
<td>1. za N' acc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>obligatory</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Ja bojus' za syna.

Lexical Functions

| Syn_i | : bespokoit'sja, trevožit'sja, volnovat'sja; opasat'sja3 |
| Anti | : nadejat'sja2 |
| Conv_{ø21p} | : (byt') strašno^{1}_3, coll. obsol. (byt') bojazno3 |
| S_{0p} | : bojaz'n'; strax1 |
| Magn | : očen'<(liter.) paničeshki, coll. bezumno, coll. diko, coll. žutko, coll. strašno^2, coll. užasno // coll. drožat'II.2 < coll. trjastis'II.2 |
PerfIncep \( \rho \) : // ispugat’sjac
PerfReal \( I_1 \) [‘izbegat’] : // pobojat’sjac [Ja pobojalsja za svoi lyži i ne poexal s nimi.]

X is very much afraid of himself, of which the speaker disapproves: // coll. drožat’II.2 <coll. trjastis’II.2> za svoju škuru

**Examples**
—Ja polučil orden Lenina, tak čto ty možgš mnoj gordit’sja. —A ja za tebja bojus’t! ‘—I’ve got the Lenin medal, so you can be proud of me.—Well, I am rather afraid for you’. Bol’se vsego Petja pobojalsja za svoi botinki: oni mogli razvalit’sja každuju sekundu ‘Most of all, P. was worried about his boots: they could fall apart at any second’.

**Phrasemes**

Bojat’sja za každyj svoj šag

I.2. Only 1sg present indicative; a polite expression.

\((Ja = X) \) bojus’t, (čto ) Y =

Buduči uveren, čto fakt Y imel, imeet ili budet imet’ mesto, čto neizvestno adresatu,²¹
govorjaščij X predstavljaet delo tak, kak budto on [tol’ko] sčitaet², čto Y imel, imeet ili budet imet’ mesto;
i

sčitaja², čto Y neželatelen dlja adresata ili dlja X-a,

X vyražaet svoje ogorčenje po povodu Y-a

[—X kak by bojalsja za adresata ili za sebja].

‘Being certain that the fact Y has taken, is taking or will take place, which is not known to the addressee,

the speaker X represents the state of affairs as if X [only] believed that Y has taken, is taking or will take place;
and

believing that Y is undesirable for the addresssee or X,

X expresses his being upset because of Y

[—as if X were afraid for the addresssee or himself]’.

**Government Pattern**

<table>
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<th>X = I</th>
<th>Y = II</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Ja</td>
<td>1. čto CLAUSE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| obligatory |
|Ja bojus’t, čto vaš uvažaemyj opponent prav ‘I’m afraid that your honorable opponent is right’.

Bojus’t, čto vy budete razočarovany ‘I’m afraid you’ll be disappointed’.

**Syntactic Properties**

1) *Ja bojus’t* can also be used as a parenthetical clause; *ja* can be omitted except in the final sentence position:

\((Ja) bojus’t, vy ošiblis’ adresom. = Vy, (ja) bojus’t, ošiblis’ adresom. = Vy ošiblis’ adresom, ja bojus’t.*<Vy ošiblis’ adresom, bojus’t.>
2) B.I.2 cannot be negated: the sentence

Ja ne bojuš’, čto vy ošiblis’ adresom ‘I am not afraid that you used a wrong address’.

can only mean ‘It is not the case [that I believe that you used a wrong address, which is undesirable for you or for me, or I am in an emotional state caused by ...]’, i.e., bojus’ represents here B.I.1b.

**Lexical Functions**

**Anti**₁ : nadejat’sja3

**Examples**

Muzyka, bojus’, možet soobščit’ ètomu tekstu tol’ko aspekt melodramy ‘Music, I’m afraid, might only impart to this text a melodramatic aspect ‘[I. Brodsky on Axmatova’s ‘Requiem’; from S.Volkov, ‘Vspominaja Annu Axmatovu’].

II. no gerund.²² X boitsja Y-a =

Neoduševlennyj X takov, čto X portitsjα pod vozdejstviem Y-a [— X kak boitsja I.1a Y-a].

‘Inanimate X is such that the action of Y upon X damages X [— as if X were afraid of Y]’.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. N nom</td>
<td>2. N gen obligatory</td>
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</table>

Sukno boitsja pyli ‘Broadcloth is sensitive to dust’.

9Eto lekarstvo boitsja sveta ‘This medicine is sensitive to light’.

**Lexical Functions**

**Syn**₀ : portit’sja

**Syn**₁ : ne vynosit’, ploxo perenosit’

**Anti**₁ : xorošo perenosit’

**Conv**₂₁₀ : (byt’) vreden

**Examples**

Aforizm boitsja ... vozraženij ‘Aphorism is sensitive to objections’ [A. Zholkovsky]. Finikovaja pal’ma ne boitsja zasuxi ‘The date palm is not sensitive to drought’. Romantičeskaja ljubov’ boitsja byta ‘Romantic love is sensitive to everyday life’.

**NAD8EIJAT’SJA**, jus’, jutsja, reflexivum tantum; no perfective aspect.

1. X nadeetsjα, čto Y =

Želaja, čtoj imel mesto fakt (, estestvenno svjazannyj s) Y,

X ožidaet, čto ėtot fakt budet imet’ mesto, ili sčitaet’ vysokoverojatnym, čto on imel/imeet mesto,

ili

X naxoditsjα v prijatnom èmocional’nom sostojanii, kotoroe kauzirovano ètim ožidaniem ili mneniem X-a; čto sostojanie — takoe, kakoe obyčno kauzirietsjα ožidaniem Želatel’nogo.

‘Wishing a fact (naturally related to) Y to take place,

X expects that this fact will take place or X believes it very likely that it has taken/is taking
X is in a pleasant emotional state which is caused by this expectation or belief of X, this state being such as is usually caused by the expectation of something desirable’.

**Government Pattern**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>X</th>
<th>Y</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$N_{\text{nom}}$</td>
<td>$N_{\text{acc}}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$V_{\text{inf}}$</td>
<td>( (\text{na to } \text{čto}) ) CLAUSE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1) CII.1: either $N = S_0(V)$, or in the given context ‘$N$’ determines the fact $X$ wishes to take place

- Mat’ vsë eščë nadeetsja ‘Mother is still hoping’.
- Vasja nadeetsja tol’ko na vmešatel’stvo druzej, lit. ‘V. only hopes for an intervention by his friends’.
- On ne poexal poezdom, tak kak vsë eščë nadeetsja na samolët ‘He didn’t take the train, because he still hopes to get a plane ticket <that a plane will be available’.
- Belka podojdët, ona nadeetsja ot tebja čto-nibud’ polučit’ ‘The squirrel is coming, he hopes to get something from you’.
- Tanja nadejalas’ (na to ) čto eščë zastanet otca v Živyx ‘T. hoped that she could still see Father alive’.

**Syntactic Properties**

1) N.1 admits the ellipsis of its complement clause in a dialogue when the whole construction is used as a positive answer to a preceding question:

- Otec priedet zavtra? — (Ja ) nadejus‘=< Nadejus’, čto da >.

N: BOJAT’ SJA I.1b, antonymous to N.1, does not admit such an ellipsis:

- Otec priedet zavtra? — *(Ja ) bojus’ [Correct answer: (Ja ) bojus’, čto da ].

**Lexical Functions**

- Syn: rassčityvat’1 [na N]; verit’; oŽidat’
- Anti: bojat’ sjaI.1b
- Antip: otčaivat’ sja2
- Antil: somnevat’ sja a
- $S_0$: nadeŽda’1
- $S_2$ : nadeŽda’3
- Magn[‘believe’]: tvërdo
- Magn[‘emotion’]: gorjačo, vsem serdcem, vsej dušoj // liter. upovat’ [na N]
- AntiVer: zrja, naprasno, tščetno
- Fin: // otčaivat’ sja1
- promising Y to X, Caus: // obnaděŽit’
- A1Liqu: // beznaděŽnyj1

**Examples**
Ne bojsja, ne nadejsja, ne prosi! ‘Don’t be afraid, don’t hope, don’t ask [for something]!’ [A. Galič]. My tvěrdo nadeemsja na pobedu <na sčastlivyj isxod> ‘We firmly hope to win <for a good outcome>‘. Vopreki očevidnosti, ona gorjačo nadejalas’, čto syn eščë vernětsja ‘Against all evidence, she kept hoping ardently that her son would come back’.

2. X nadeetsja na Z = Želaja, čtoby imel mesto opredelěnnýj fakt, X sčitaet2 vysokoverojatnym, čto Z skauziruet ètot fakt. ‘Wishing a certain fact to take place, X believes it very likely that Z will cause this fact’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Pattern</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X = I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. na Nacc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Nnom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mat’ vpolne nadeetsja na tebja ‘Mother relies fully on you’.
Vasja nadeetsja toľko na vmešatel’stvo druzej ‘V. only hopes for / relies on an intervention by his friends’ [ambiguous between N.1 and N.2].
Tanja nadejalas’ na svoi lyŽi <na svoju lovkost> ‘T. relied on her skis <upon her agility>‘.

Lexical Functions

| Syn₁ | : polagat’sja, rassčityvat’2 [na N]; doverjat’ |
| Anti₁ | : bojat’sja 1.1c; somnevatsja b |
| S₀ | : nadeŽda¹2 |
| S₂₁ | : nadeŽda¹3 |
| Able₂ | : naděŽnyj |
| non Able₂ | : nenaděŽnyj |
| Magn | : vpolne; kak na skalу, kak na kamennuju goru , substant. krepko | Z denotes a person |
| AntiVer | : zrja, naprasno |
| AntiPerfReal₁ | : // ponadejat’sja [Ponadejalsja ja na nego — i_zrja <a on menja podvēl>] |
| PerfReal₂ | : // ne podvesti |
| AntiPerfReal₂ | : // podvesti |

If wanting something, a person should not rely on fate but should struggle to have what he/she wants : Na Boga nadejsja, a sam ne plošaj [proverb]

Examples

Ty zrja nadeeš’ja na počtovyju upakovku ‘It’s a mistake to trust post-office wrapping’ [or ‘It’s a mistake to believe that the post-office will supply the wrapping’]: ambiguous between N.1 and N.2].

3. Only 1sg present indic. and (less current) 1pl imperative (= budem nadejat’sja); a polite expression.
(Ja = X) nadejus', čto Y =

Sčitaj vysokoverojetnym, čto fakt Y imel, imeet ili budet imet' mesto i čto Y Želatelen dlja adresata ili dlja X-a,
govorjačij X vyražae svoj udogovol'st'ie po povodu Y-a [— X kak by nadeetsja, čto Y].

'Believing it very likely that the fact Y has taken, is taking or will take place
and that Y is desirable for the addressee or X,
the speaker X expresses his pleasure because of Y[— as if X were hoping that Y]'.

**Government Pattern**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>X = I</th>
<th>Y = II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Ja</td>
<td>1. čto CLAUSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. My</td>
<td>obligatory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1) C\textsubscript{1.2} : my 'we' is obligatorily elided.

Ja nadejus', čto vaš uvažaemyj opponent neprav ‘I hope that your honorable opponent is
wrong’.

Vy, ja nadejus', polučili <esčě polučite >moë priglašenie ‘You, I hope, have received
<will still receive> my invitation’.

Vy, budem nadejat’šja, esčě polučite moë priglašenie ‘You, let’s hope, will still receive
my invitation’.

**Syntactic Properties**

1) Ja nadejus’ and budem nadejat’šja can be used as a parenthetical clause; ja can be
omitted in all positions:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(Ja)} & \text{ nadejus' } \leq \text{ budem nadejat'šja}, \text{ vy ne ošiblis' adresom } = \\
\text{Vy, (ja) nadejus' } & \leq \text{ budem nadejat'šja}, \text{ ne ošiblis' adresom } = \\
\text{Vy ne ošiblis' adresom, (ja) nadejus' } & \leq \text{ budem nadejat'šja}.
\end{align*}
\]

2) N.3 cannot be negated: the sentence

Ja ne nadejus’, čto vy polučili priglašenie ‘I don’t hope that you have received the invitation’.

can only mean ‘It is not the case [that I believe that you have received the invitation, which is
desirable for me, or I am in an emotional state caused by ...]’, i.e., nadejus’ represents here
N.1.

**Lexical Functions**

\text{Anti}_\text{i} : bojat’sjaI.2

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

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Zaliznjak went through the subsequent versions; Lisette Frigo and Anna Wierzbicka corrected our
English. We highly appreciate their friendly help and we tried, to the best of our abilities, to take
their objections and constructive proposals into consideration. All the mistakes and omissions that
remained are of course our own responsibility.

The situation here calls to mind the distinction between phonemes and actual speech sounds. Phonemes are linguistic entities with ‘sharp edges’ such that all the distinctions between them are clear-cut and no intermediate cases are possible. On the contrary, speech sounds are not quite discrete: they can, so to speak, flow into one another, so that intermediate cases abound. The procedure for identifying actual sounds in terms of phonemes, or ‘stretching’ the phonemic schemata to ‘pull’ them over the actual sound chain, does not, strictly speaking, belong to phonology qua phonology; it lies outside linguistics in the narrow sense of the term. Similarly, linguistic meanings are discrete and clear-cut, while the corresponding concepts or psychological images are often continuous and fuzzy. Stretching linguistic semantic schemata in order to ‘pull’ them over real-world’s psychological reflections is probably not a task for linguistics qua linguistics; in any event, it will not be considered here.

The term dominant is used to refer to the semantic component which is generic for the entity denoted by the corresponding lexeme — in the sense that it refers to its genus: thus, for ‘buyer’ the dominant component is ‘person’, while for ‘to buy’ it is ‘to acquire’ (Polguère 1990, Iordanskaja and Polguère 1988). To put it differently, the dominant component is communicatively central to the meaning in question. One can also say that a given meaning can be ‘reduced’ to its dominant component: ‘a buyer’ is a kind of person, and ‘to buy’ is a kind of acquiring.

Anna Zaliznjak (1983: 59–60) maintains that (i)

(i) Ja bojus$, čto on opozdaet, ‘I’m afraid that he’ll be late’.

(where she considers bojus$ to be a pure belief verb) cannot be paraphrased using the lexeme STRAX and quotes (ii):

(ii) *To, čto on opozdaet, vnu2saet mne strax, lit. ‘That he’ll be late gives me fear’.

We agree that (ii) is bad on the intended reading — but then (ii) IS NOT a legitimate paraphrase of (i), which should be (iii):

(iii) Mysl$, čto on opozdaet, vnu2saet mne strax, lit. ‘The idea that he’ll be late gives me fear’.

Sentence (ii) — a paraphrase of bojus$ as a belief verb — contains a semantic conflict: STRAX ‘fear’ implies an expectation or likelihood of ‘being late’ but the to, čto- construction is factive: it represents the fact ‘being late’ as having taken place.

An actant of a lexeme L is a sentence element which depends on L and is required by L’s meaning. We distinguish semantic vs syntactic actants of L: a semantic actant of L is a semantic item which can occupy an argument slot in the signified of L, this signified being a predicate; a syntactic actant of L is a phrase which expresses one of L’s semantic actants. Thus, in a sentence such
as The boy likes the cat, the meanings ‘boy’ and ‘cat’ are semantic actants of the meaning ‘like’ [= ‘like(boy, cat)’]; while NPs the boy and the cat are syntactic actants of the verb like

\[ = \text{ the boy } \subseteq \text{ like } \text{ the cat } \].

For more on the notion of actant, see Mel’čuk 1988a: 56, 66, 69.

6 This distinction as applied to English afraid is stated in Apresjan 1979: 30, 524. Cf. also the division of emotions into occurrent vs. dispositional in Pitcher 1965: 331 ff.

7 The accusative is used only for specific ANIMATE Ys; the čto- construction — for specific EVENTS. An accusative NP = Y with BOJAT$SJAI.la implies the ‘contact’ of X with Y in the location mentioned or understood (the genitive does not carry such a specific implication):

(i) On ne vojdët v zal: boitsja ženu [ACC] ‘He won’t go into the room: he’s afraid of his wife’ [the wife is present here and now].

vs.

On ne vojdët v zal: boitsja ženy [GEN] ‘idem’ [the wife is not necessarily present].

We should point out, however, that the semantic distinction indicated tends to disappear in Modern Russian and is not strictly observed by all speakers; many, especially — younger people, do not admit the accusative with BOJAT$SJA at all. (Cf. a different description of the accusative vs genitive opposition in Zaliznjak 1985: 9.)

Note that the use of an accusative phrase with a reflexive verb is rather a rarity in Russian: the other case known is SLU2SAT$SJA ‘obey’(On slu2saetsja ma$t ‘He obeys his mother’).

8 The particular application of the Apresjan Criterion used in this case is known as the Gapping Test (L1 and L2 form a conjoined phrase); see Green 1969. Cf. also Mel’čuk 1988b: 183, Criterion 7. —

As for many other linguistic criteria and tests, the Apresjan Criterion is not absolute: its indication is only one, albeit a very important one, among various factors in our decision to unite or separate two presumed subsenses. Differences in syntactic and lexical cooccurrence can outweigh it.

9 With the obvious exception of possible personifications of animals.

10 Along with the negation test, the cooccurrence with the adverb naprasno ‘in vain, wrongly’ also helps to isolate and formulate the assertional part in BOJAT$SJAI.la, b, c and in NADEJAT$SJA1, 2 (Zaliznjak 1983: 61 and 1985: 16):

(i) Sveta naprasno bojalas$ xudet$ ‘S. was wrong to be afraid of losing weight’.

means that she was wrong in her expectation that what could happen to her as a result of losing weight was UNDESIRABLE for her; therefore, in (i), i.e. in B.I.1a, the component ‘undesirable’ belongs to the assertion. On the contrary, (ii)

(ii)Sveta naprasno bojalas$, čto poxudeet ‘S. was wrong to be afraid that she would lose weight’.

means that she was wrong in her expectation that the process itself, which is undesirable for her, WOULD TAKE PLACE; therefore, in (ii), i.e. in B.I.1b, the component ‘will take place’ belongs to the assertion, while the component ‘undesirable’ belongs to the presupposition.
For an explanation of the connection between the presuppositions of a given verb and its capacity to admit the Neg-Transportation, see Iordanskaja 1986. — As for the German HOFFEN, the assertional character of the desirability component is borne out by the following evidence:

- The lexical cooccurrence of HOFFEN is similar to that of WUNSCHEN ‘to desire’: for instance, hoffen takes the same bound intensifiers innig ‘intensely’ or von ganzem Herzen, lit. ‘from whole heart’, as wünschen.
- Unlike Russian and English, a sentence with a negated hoffen means the negation of desirability: thus, sentence (i):

  (i) Ich hoffe nicht, diese Arbeit zu bekommen, lit. ‘I don’t hope to get this job’.

  can only mean ‘I don’t want to get this job, but I think it will happen’.

  To express the negation of high likelihood, German uses expressions like Ich kann nicht hoffen, daß ... ‘I cannot hope that ...’ or Ich habe keine Hoffnung, daß ... ‘I have no hope that ...’.

12 Actually, psychologists often speak of a third dimension, called ‘activity’; its status is, however, quite vague, and we do not see its relevance for a semantic description of emotion words.

13 ‘Various emotional states seem to differ in terms of the organism’s gross level of physiological arousal or activation. <...> [More subtle differences] are accounted for by the individual’s cognitive interpretation of the situation in which he experiences the state of activation. <...> Thus, given the same level of high activation a person labels his emotional state as ‘joy’ or ‘anger’ as a function of how he sees the precipitating situation’ (Davitz 1964: 194). Cf., in this connection, Pitcher 1965.

14 A lexical function $f$ is, roughly speaking, a semantico-syntactic relation that specifies, for a given lexical item L, a set of lexical items which express — contingent on L — a meaning or a syntactic role associated with $f$. For instance, the lexical function Magn supplies for L the corresponding intensifiers: Magn(belief) = staunch, Magn(to blush) = deeply, Magn(rain) = heavy, Magn(new) = brand-, Magn(to apologize) = profusely, etc. Lexical functions constitute one of important innovations of the Explanatory Combinatorial Dictionary (Mel’čuk and Žolkovskij 1984, Mel’čuk et al. 1984, 1988). For more on lexical functions, see Mel’čuk 1988a: 61 ff.

15 It is interesting to compare the proposed structure of meanings of emotion words to psychologists’ structure of emotions themselves: for instance, ‘... emotions normally comprise antecedent conditions <...>, appraisals relative to one’s goals, standards, or attitudes <...>, physiological consequences <...>, and what might be called dispositional consequences <...>’ (Ortony and Clore 1989: 127).

16 Cf., however, Lëgkij strax zakralsja v ego du2su, lit. ‘A light fear crept into his soul’, and ego paničeskaja bojazn$temnoty$, ‘his hysterical fear of the dark’.

17 In our previous publications (Iordanskaja 1970 and Mel’čuk and Žolkovskij 1984) we failed to indicate this presupposition of quasi-factivity in the verbs in question. — Interestingly enough, verbs of the type RADOVAT$SJA ‘to be happy’ become, so to speak, more factive when in the perfective:

(i) Fedja radovalsja [IMPERF] tomu , četo zanajtija otmeneny, — a na samom dele, oni ne byli otmeneny ‘F. was happy because the classes had been cancelled, while in point of fact they hadn’t’.

sounds more natural than
(ii) Fedja obradovalsja [PERF] tomu, čto zanjatija otmeneny. — ?a na samom dele, oni ne byli otmeneny, lit. ‘F. has become happy because the classes had been cancelled, while in point of fact they hadn’t’.

As pointed out in Padučeva 1985: 70-71, the same property characterizes the so-called short adjectives quasi-synonymous with the corresponding verbs:

(iii) Fedja byl rad tomu, čto zanjatija otmeneny. — ?a na samom dele, oni ne byli otmeneny ‘F. was glad because the classes had been cancelled, while in point of fact they hadn’t’.

When negated, RADOVAT$SSJA is completely factive:

(iv) Fedja ne radovalsja tomu, čto zanjatija otmeneny. — * a na samom dele, oni ne byli otmeneny ‘F. wasn’t happy in connection with the fact the classes had been cancelled, while in point of fact they hadn’t’.

Cf., in this connection, Zaliznjak 1988, which discusses the correlations between factivity of a verb and its grammatical form (aspect, tense, person, negation, the type of the subordinated clause, etc.).

Note also that other emotion verbs may be more factive than RADOVAT$SSJA:

(v) Fedja serdilsja na to <udviljalsja tomu>, čto zanjatija otmeneny. — ?? a na samom dele, oni ne byli otmeneny ‘F. was angry <surprised> because the classes had been cancelled, while in point of fact they hadn’t’.

18 On the lexicographic treatment of performatives, in particular, on their incompatibility with negation and modifiers, see, among others, Apresjan 1986: 212-215.

19 This might be explained by the fact that the governed expressions in question can appear as Direct Speech (as exclamations or questions): Kak by ona ne poexala verxom! ‘If only she hasn’t gone for a ride!’ or Ne poexala li ona verxom? ‘Hasn’t she gone for a ride?’ An exclamation and a question form a separate speech act and therefore cannot be in the scope of negation applied to the main verb. The case of C$II.5 = čtoby... ne + CLAUSE$perf is more problematic: for this construction to constitute a legitimate Direct Exclamation, it must be introduced by TOL$KO: Tol$ko čtoby ona ne poexala verxom!. ‘If only I knew she hasn’t gone for a ride!’<*čtoby ona ne poexala verxom! >.

20 It seems useful to show how the component ‘boitsja I.1b’ within the definition of ‘boitsja I.1c’ can be replaced by its own definition. The whole clause introduced by čto in ‘boitsja I.1c’ is Y of ‘boitsja I.1b’; let us perform the substitution:

\[ X \text{boitsja I.1c } za \text{ Z } = \]

‘Wishing the fact ‘Z will undergo or has undergone an event which X perceives as something undesirable for Z’ not to take place,

X expects that this fact will take place or believes it very likely that it has taken or is taking place or

X is in an unpleasant emotional state with respect to this fact...; this state is such as is ... ‘.

21 The relevance of this component is shown by the inappropriateness of using B.I.2 in a situation where the addressee cannot be unaware of his problem: *Bojus$, ty popal v bol$nicu! ‘You are in a hospital, I am afraid’ is unacceptable if addressed to someone already on a hospital bed. (This interesting detail has been pointed out to us by Anna Zaliznjak.)

22 Cf. Sukno, *bojass pyli, ne dolŽno ostavat$sla snaruŽi ‘Broadcloth, being sensitive to dust, should not remain outside’. (Thanks to N. Pertsov for this observation.)
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