

Textual Connectors Across Languages: French EN EFFET vs. Russian V SAMOM DELE

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Anna, droga przyjaciółko — prosimy Cię o przyjęcie tego artykułu jako idącego z serca podarunku.

The name Wierzbicka is synonymous with semantic analysis, semantic decomposition and semantic primitives, semantic subtleties, semantic peculiarities of specific languages: over the last 20 years Anna Wierzbicka has become an indisputable *maître* in these matters. Therefore, if the pitiless passage of time has brought about the pleasant necessity of writing a contribution to Anna's *Festschrift*, we have no choice but to write about semantic analysis, semantic decomposition, and semantic differences between languages—and this is just what we have chosen to do in this paper.

1. Introduction

We propose a comparative semantic analysis of two quasi-equivalent phraseological expressions, or *phrasemes*, in French and Russian: Fr. 'EN EFFET' ('indeed') and Rus. 'V SAMOM DELE' ('indeed') (the phrasemes will be shown by upper semibrackets). We would like to emphasize at the outset that the English glosses supplied for these phrasemes are very approximate: indeed English does not have direct equivalents for them. This in itself is a good illustration of the point we are making in the paper: the semantic structure of such expressions is as language-specific as is usually deemed normal for other types of expressions in the lexicon.¹

The two phrasemes are a particular type of lexical unit [= LU], known as *textual connectors*; these, in their turn, are a subclass of so-called *non-descriptive* LUs (see 2). Textual connectors are of special interest for semantic research: they have a number of particularities that have not as yet been studied in depth, least of all in the context of a cross-linguistic comparison. In addition, our choice has been motivated by the existence of Wierzbicka 1978(1971), a paper dealing with 'metatextual operators'—a set of LUs that includes textual connectors. *En effet*, it seems appropriate to develop some of Wierzbicka's ideas in a contribution to her *Festschrift*.

Our description is carried out within an essentially lexicographic approach: for the two LUs in question, we provide full-fledged dictionary articles representing their separate senses. More specifically, we give lexicographic definitions intended to capture their meaning, sketch their idiosyncratic prosodic and syntactic properties, and indicate their lexical ties (i.e., we mention other LUs that can be used instead of them in texts). All this is done within the framework of the Explanatory Combinatorial Dictionary [= ECD], which is one of the central components of the Meaning-Text model of language, developed by the Meaning-Text theory (Mel'cuk 1974, 1981, 1988: 43-101;

Mel'cuk and Zholkovsky 1988; Mel'cuk *et al.* 1984, 1988, 1992, 1995). In our description we use—without special explanations—the principles and formalisms of the ECD, relying, on the one hand, on the references provided, and on the other hand, on the intuitive clarity of the presentation and the examples. However, it is probably helpful to formulate here the basic principle that the lexicographic definitions of our LUs are supposed to observe:

|| An LU and its lexicographic definition must be fully mutually substitutable in any text—*salva significatione* [= ‘without affecting meaning’].

The principle of absolute mutual substitutability of any LU and its definition, declared and staunchly defended by Wierzbicka from the beginning of her linguistic career, is also a linchpin of the semantic description in the Meaning-Text framework. It follows from this principle that the appropriate way to criticize the proposed definitions is to find contexts in which either the LU under consideration cannot be replaced with its definition or, inversely, the definition cannot be expressed by the corresponding LU.

The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the concept of non-descriptive lexical unit and present a typology thereof; Section 3 contains a lexicographic description of the phrasemes under study; Section 4 is dedicated to a linguistic discussion of the descriptions proposed; Section 5 offers a systematic semantic comparison of the French and Russian vocables described; and, finally, Section 6 formulates our conclusions.

2. Non-descriptive Lexical Units

As we have indicated, the phrasemes Fr. ‘EN EFFET’ and Rus. ‘V SAMOM DELE’ are examples of *textual connectors*, a subclass of the important semantic class of LUs which are called *non-descriptive LUs*. In order to characterize these phrasemes semantically, we have to begin with the distinction between descriptive and non-descriptive LUs and then to sketch a classification of non-descriptive LUs. This, in turn, requires some basic concepts, which we will now introduce.

However, before we can start, we need to give the reader a preliminary idea of the distinction at stake. Consider the following pairs of sentences:

- (1) **a.** *He thanked her profusely.*
vs.
Thank you so much [, he said].
- b.** *I want taxes to be abolished.*
vs.
Down with taxes!
- c.** *[This feature is found in marsupials.] I will give an example: [kangaroo, ...]*
vs.
[This feature is found in marsupials,] for example, [kangaroo, ...]

Both sentences of each pair present the same real world situation, but the first one uses a descrip-

tive LU, while the second, a corresponding non-descriptive one.

2.1. Basic Concepts

2.1.1. 'Enunciator' vs. 'speaker'

In the lexicographic definitions of non-descriptive LUs, the distinction between 'enunciator' and 'speaker' must be strictly observed. This distinction can be explained as follows:

Let there be a *primary* (direct, or actual) speech act; it may refer to another speech act—a *secondary* (indirect, or reported) one. The author of any speech act is called *enunciator*, while the author of a primary speech act is the *speaker*. Thus the speaker is a particular case of enunciator; to put it differently, 'speaker' = 'I' = 'primary enunciator'. The sentence

(2) *John answered that he would come later.*

represents a primary speech act; its author—the person who said (2)—is a primary enunciator, i.e. the speaker. But (2) tells us about John's answer, this answer corresponding to a secondary speech act; John is a secondary enunciator. Thus, 'enunciator' can be defined by the disjunction:

'enunciator' = 'speaker or secondary enunciator'.

The opposition 'enunciator' vs. 'speaker' is relevant for defining non-descriptive LUs in two respects:

First, the lexicographic definition of any non-descriptive LU must necessarily contain one of the components 'enunciator' or 'speaker' (see 2.1.3).

Second, the opposition 'enunciator' vs. 'speaker' allows us to account for the following property of non-descriptive LUs: some cannot be used in reported speech, while some others, semantically very close to them, can; cf.:

(3) Fr. *Pierre dit* : " $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{Bref} \\ \textit{En résumé} \end{array} \right\}$, *mon revenu baisse trop*".

'Peter says: " $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{To sum up} \\ \textit{In a nutshell} \end{array} \right\}$, my revenue is decreasing too much"'.
vs.

Pierre dit que $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{*bref} \\ \textit{en résumé} \end{array} \right\}$ *son revenu baisse trop*.

'Peter says that $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{*to sum up} \\ \textit{in a nutshell} \end{array} \right\}$, his revenue is decreasing too much'.

In order to account for this distribution, we propose that 'speaker' is a component of the lexicographic definitions of those non-descriptive LUs which cannot be used in the reported speech, while 'enunciator' is a component of the definitions of those which can.

Both Fr. 「EN EFFET」 and Rus. 「V SAMOM DELE」—at least in one sense illustrated below—can appear in reported speech:

(4) a. Fr. *Pierre a dit que cette description est en effet insuffisante* 'Peter said that this description is indeed insufficient'.

b. Rus. *Pëtr skazal, cto èto opisanie v samom dele nedostatočnoe* 'idem'.

Consequently, the corresponding definitions include the component 'enunciator' (rather than 'speaker').

The inability of certain non-descriptive LUs to appear in reported speech is intimately linked to a more general problem known as 'Main Clause Phenomena' (Green 1976, Bolinger 1977) or as 'syntactic in subordinability' (Paduceva 1990): certain linguistic units cannot be used in subordinate clauses of any kind (e.g., expressions of the type *Isn't this so?* or *He'll regret this one day!*, or else imperative forms). Without a special study in this domain, we limit ourselves to the following hypothesis:

The inability of a non-descriptive linguistic unit to be part of a subordinate clause can be expressed by the presence, in its semantic description, of the component 'speaker' (rather than 'enunciator').

2.1.2. 'Communicate' vs. 'signal'

In the perspective of a semantic study of non-descriptive LUs, the vocabulary of a language can be broken down into two major classes of LUs: *informative LUs*, used with the purpose to inform, and *performative LUs*, used with the purpose of performing an action that is external with respect to speech, but can be realized only via an act of speaking (we mean here such actions as promising, swearing, confirming, baptizing, ...).²

Furthermore, it is important to distinguish among the informative LUs non-predicative vs. predicative LUs, and among the latter, two further types: *communicative* vs. *signalative* LUs. These two types of LUs correspond to two types of presentation of information in natural language: either the enunciator COMMUNICATES something (represents or describes it: this is the *Darstellungsfunktion* of language, in Bühler's terms), or he SIGNALS something (expresses or marks it : the *Ausdrucksfunktion* of Bühler). Vezbicka 1978(1971): 410 ff. discusses an application of this distinction to the techniques used to express the topic of a sentence in Polish (where the status of X as topic is communicated via a lexical expression meaning 'as far as X is concerned') and in Japanese (where the topic status of X is signaled by the particle [X-]wa), as well as to metatextual elements signaling the ordering of ideas in the text (*firstly, secondly*, etc.). The distinction in the way linguistic information is 'packaged'—is it designed to communicate or to signal?—pervades the language; it is manifested at all levels of grammar and lexicon. We propose to reflect this distinction by means of two different semantic components in the lexicographic definitions of communicative vs. signalative LUs—or, more generally, in the semantic structure of communicative vs. signalative utterances.

The semantic structure of a COMMUNICATIVE utterance must contain the component 'the enunciator/speaker wants that the addressee knows that ...'³ (this is what Wierzbicka calls "the modal frame"). For example, (5) is a communicative utterance; through it the speaker communic-

ates [= 'wants that the addressee knows'] that he wants taxes to be abolished:

(5) **a.** *I want you to abolish taxes.*

The semantic structure of a SIGNALATIVE utterance, on the other hand, must contain the component 'the enunciator/speaker signals that ...':

b. *Abolish taxes!*

c. *Down with taxes!*

Sentences (5b-c) are signalative utterances: by uttering them, the speaker signals—but does not communicate—that he wants taxes to be abolished.

Thus the distinction between a declarative expression of an idea, on the one hand, and an imperative or exclamative expression (of type (5b-c)) of the same idea, on the other hand, is in this way reduced to a general semantic distinction: '[to] communicate' ~ '[to] signal'. This distinction is intensely exploited in the present paper.

Since communicating is considered to be the basic, prototypical, "unmarked" speech act, the component 'the speaker wants that the addressee knows that ...' can, as an abbreviation, be systematically omitted from the definitions of the communicative LUs.

2.1.3. Descriptive vs. Non-descriptive LUs

An LU is *descriptive* if its function is to communicate (or at least to contribute to a communication). The descriptive LUs include the LUs referring to beings, to objects, to substances, etc. (these are "names" in the semantic sense), as well as LUs referring to actions, states, properties, relations, etc. ("predicates" in the semantic sense).

An LU is *non-descriptive* if its function is to implement either a performative speech act, or an informative speech act which is signaling rather than communicating. Thus the non-descriptive LUs cover two heterogeneous classes of units:

- PERFORMATIVE LUs: these correspond to speech acts which consist in an actual uttering of these LUs;
- INFORMATIVE SIGNALATIVE LUs: these correspond to a special way of presenting linguistic information (signaling rather than communicating).

Unlike a descriptive LU, a non-descriptive LU has in its definition—as the central component—a special indication of its non-descriptive character. This indication can be either 1) a designation of the speaker's speech act **A** (of course, **A** 'communication'): 'the speaker does **A** ...', or 2) a specification of signaling: 'the enunciator/speaker signals that ...'.

The non-descriptive LUs are characterized by the following syntactic properties (Le groupe λ -1 1975: 249-254; Apresjan 1986: 210-216; Iordanskaja 1992: 29-34, 1993: 161-164):

|| In contrast to a descriptive LU, a non-descriptive LU does not accept negation, nor interrogation, nor modification.

Take two English adverbs: *P NATURALLY1* ('P in a natural way' (P being any proposition), which is descriptive, and *P, NATURALLY2* ('the enunciator signaling that he finds the fact P natural, P'), which is non-descriptive:

(6) **a.** *He offered his apology naturally* [NATURALLY1].

vs.

He offered his apology, naturally [NATURALLY2].

Negation

b. *He offered his apology, but not naturally* [NATURALLY1].

vs.

**He offered his apology, but not naturally* [NATURALLY2].

He didn't offer his apology naturally [NATURALLY1 is in the scope of negation].

vs.

He didn't offer his apology, naturally [NATURALLY2 cannot be in the scope of negation].

Interrogation

c. *Did he offer his apology naturally?*

vs.

**Did he offer his apology, naturally?*

Modification

d. *He offered his apology almost naturally.*

vs.

**He offered his apology, almost naturally.*⁴

The indicated property can supply an operational test for establishing non-descriptive LUs. More specifically, this test identifies the French phraseme 'EN EFFET' and the Russian phraseme 'V SAMOM DELE' as non-descriptive LUs. We will illustrate this with the example of 'EN EFFET', taken in one particular sense ('EN EFFET'2, see 3):

(7) **a.** *Sir Henry a reconnu le revolver ; en effet, il s'était exercé à tirer avec cet après-midi* ('Sir Henry recognized the revolver; in fact, he had practiced shooting with it that afternoon').

b. **Il s'était exercé à tirer avec, mais pas en effet, cet après-midi* ('He had practiced shooting with it, but not in fact, that afternoon').

c. **Est-ce en effet qu'il s'était exercé à tirer avec cet après-midi ?* ('Was it in fact that he had practiced shooting with it that afternoon?')

d. **Complètement en effet, il s'était exercé à tirer avec cet après-midi* ('Fully in fact, he had practiced shooting with it that afternoon').

2.2. Typology of Non-descriptive LUs

The set of non-descriptive LUs is itself subdivided into several classes. We cannot attempt an exhaustive classification of non-descriptive LUs here. However, we would like to indicate at least their major classes—just to place the particular LUs studied in this paper better.

A non-descriptive lexical unit L can be:

1. A **performative**: a lexical unit L such that uttering it constitutes a performative speech act—the speaker's action which L designates (*Good-bye!* = 'By uttering this, the speaker 'TAKES LEAVE' from his interlocutor'; *Thank you!* = 'By uttering this, the speaker THANKS his interlocutor'; *I swear!* 'By uttering this, the speaker SWEARS that what he has just said is true').
2. A **signalative**: a lexical unit L such that uttering it constitutes signaling of something by the enunciator.

In its turn, a signalative can be of one of the two following types, implicating either the enunciator himself or the enunciator and/or his speech:

2.1. An **expressive**: a lexical unit L such that uttering it constitutes signaling by the speaker of his internal state (*Yuk!* = 'The speaker signals his disgust'; *Down with X!* = 'The speaker signals his desire to see X abolished or destroyed').

2.2. A **locutive**: a lexical unit L such that uttering it constitutes signaling by the enunciator of a piece of information concerning his speech.

A locutive may have in its scope either the contents of the speech, or the speech itself, so that we have again two subtypes:

2.2.1. An **attitudinal**: a lexical unit L such that uttering it constitutes signaling by the enunciator of his attitude toward the contents of his speech (*Curiously, P* = 'Enunciator signaling that he finds fact P curious, P').

2.2.2. A **discursive**: a lexical unit L such that uttering it constitutes signaling by the enunciator of a property (in a broad sense) of his speech.

The discursives are subdivided further:

2.2.2.1. A **characterizer**: a lexical unit L such that uttering it constitutes signaling by the enunciator of a characterization of his speech (*In a few words, P* = 'The enunciator signaling that P is formulated in a minimum of words, P'; *Roughly speaking, P* = 'The enunciator signaling that P is approximate, P'; *To tell you the truth, P* = 'The enunciator signaling that P expresses what he really thinks, P').

2.2.2.2. A **connector**: a lexical unit L such that uttering it constitutes signaling by the enunciator of a logical relation between two discourse entities (cf. *rhetorical relations* of Mann and Thompson (1987)); such a relation can be of one of the following three types:

- A relation between two facts mentioned in the discourse, or a **factual relation**; it corresponds to a **factual** connector, for instance: *P, so that Q* = 'P and, the enunciator signaling that the fact Q is a consequence of the fact P, Q'.
- A relation between a fact mentioned in the discourse and the fact of the enunciation itself,

or a *quasi-factual relation*; it corresponds to a *quasi-factual* connector, for instance: Fr. *P, bien que*⁵ *Q* = ‘P and, the enunciator signaling that the enunciation of P is not natural with respect to the fact Q, Q’ [— *Où est-il parti? Bien que, au fond, ça ne m'intéresse pas* ‘— Where is he gone? Although, in point of fact, this does not interest me’].

- A relation between two textual segments of the discourse, or a *textual relation*; it corresponds to a *textual* connector, for instance, Fr. *P, car Q* = ‘P and, the enunciator signaling that Q is a justification of P, Q’; *In short, P* = ‘The speaker signaling that P is an abbreviation of his preceding discourse, P’.

The phrasemes ‘EN EFFET’ and ‘V SAMOM DELE’ belong to this last type of lexical units: they are textual connectors.

3. Lexicographic Description of the Phrasemes under Analysis

In the five dictionary entries quoted below we use the formalism adopted in the ECD; however, contrary to the current practice of the ECD, we distribute our illustrative examples into semantically motivated groups, each of which is supplied with a subtitle—for the ease of cross-references from our linguistic comments, Section 4. Let it be emphasized as well that the definitions of French and Russian phrasemes are written—for the sake of simplicity—in English, although, in conformity with the principles of the ECD they should be, respectively, in French and Russian.

French EN EFFET

‘EN EFFET’, adverbial

1. Sentential. *En effet* ‘indeed’ =

The speaker believing or knowing that the addressee is requesting from him confirmation¹ of (an assumption expressed through) the addressee's last utterance \mathcal{E} , ||⁶
by uttering *en effet*, the speaker confirms¹ (an assumption expressed through) \mathcal{E} .

Lexical Functions

Syn : effectivement¹; ‘de fait’; assurément
Syn_n : oui; non; soit; ‘bien entendu’; ‘tout à fait’

Examples

Confirming¹ the addressee's last utterance \mathcal{E}

(8) a. A: — *Vous étiez hier au bureau!* ‘You were in the office yesterday!’

B: — *En effet. / En effet, j'y étais. / Oui, en effet. / J'y étais, en effet* ‘Indeed. / Indeed, I was. / Yes, indeed. / I was, indeed’.

b. A: — *Vous n'étiez pas hier au bureau!* ‘You weren't in the office yesterday!’

B: — *En effet. / En effet, je n'y étais pas. / Non, en effet. / J e n'y étais pas, en effet* 'Indeed. / Indeed, I wasn't. / No, indeed I wasn't. / I wasn't, indeed'.

Confirming1 an assumption expressed through ϵ

(9) a. A: — *Vous étiez hier au bureau, n'est-ce pas ?* 'You were in the office yesterday, weren't you?'

B:— *En effet./En effet, j'y étais./Oui, en effet./J'y étais, en effet* 'Indeed./Indeed, I was./ Yes, indeed./I was, indeed'.

b. A: — *"Star-Trek" est déjà à l'affiche au Rialto ?* 'Is *Star Trek* already playing at the Rialto?'

B: — *En effet ; je l'y ai vu* 'Indeed, I have seen it there'.

c. A: — *Je suis sûre que tu as encore trop fumé aujourd'hui* 'I am sure that you have smoked far too much today'.

B: — *En effet* 'Indeed'.

2. Parenthetical. *En effet, [Q]* ⁷ ' indeed' =

The enunciator signaling

that the preceding utterance ϵ or a belief ϵ that one could have as a result of preceding utterances is well-founded

and that (the fact of uttering) Q is or introduces a confirmation² of the well-foundedness of ϵ ,

[Q].

Syntactic Properties

Occupies the leftmost or the immediately postverbal position in the clause.

Lexical Functions

Syn : effectivement²

Syn_n : car; puisque

Examples

'Enunciator' (indirect speech)

(10) *Répondant à la question de Marie, qui voulait savoir s'il était allé hier au bureau, Jean a dit qu'en effet il y était allé* 'Answering Mary's question about whether he had been in the office yesterday, John said that he had indeed been there'.

Q is a proof

(11) *Il racontait que cette dame valsait à ravir. Elle a en effet gagné le concours national de valse en 1927* 'He was telling everyone that this lady waltzed magnificently. In fact she won the National Waltzing Competition in 1927'.

Q is a causal explanation

(12) a. — *J'aime ce roman ; en effet, il parle des choses qui m'intéressent le plus* 'I like this novel;

you see, it speaks of things which I find most interesting’.

- b.** *La description proposée présente un caractère restrictif. En effet, elle a été élaborée par un jeune chercheur qui n'était pas en mesure de considérer plusieurs cas importants* ‘The proposed description is limited in nature. You see, it has been developed by a young researcher who was unable to consider many important cases’.
- c.** *Le météorologiste ne peut intervenir efficacement dans le développement d'une perturbation. En effet, il n'y a pas de pilule, même de pilule atomique, assez puissante pour rivaliser avec l'énergie dégagée dans une simple tempête* ‘The meteorologist cannot intervene effectively in the development of a disturbance. You see, there is no pill, not even an atomic pill, powerful enough to counteract the energy released by a simple thunderstorm’.
- d.** A: — *Marie s'est comportée de façon tellement bizarre qu'on pensait à appeler l'ambulance* ‘Mary behaved in such a loony way that we thought we better call an ambulance’.
- B: — *En effet, elle est complètement dingue* ‘She really is completely nuts’.

Q is a clarification

- (13) **a.** *Cette dame valsait à ravir. Elle valsait en effet d'une manière telle que tous les cœurs étaient entraînés dans les ondulations de sa robe vaporeuse* ‘This lady waltzed magnificently. Indeed she waltzed in such a way that everyone was carried away by the undulations of her vaporous dress’.
- b.** *La description proposée présente un caractère restrictif. En effet, elle ne rend pas compte de plusieurs cas importants* ‘The proposed description is limited in nature. Indeed, it does not take into account many important cases’.

Q is a confirmation1

- (14) *Il racontait que cette dame valsait à ravir. En effet, elle valsait à ravir* ‘He was telling everyone that this lady waltzed magnificently. She really did waltz magnificently’.

Q is an interrogative sentence

- (15) **a.** A: — *Pierre n'est pas là, et je commence à m'inquiéter* ‘Pete isn't here, and I am beginning to worry’.
- B: — *En effet, où pourrait-il se trouver à présent ?* ‘Where indeed could he be now?’
- b.** *Je ne sais pas comment analyser cette construction. En effet, que veut dire "shmushmu"? Personne ne peut répondre à cette question* ‘I don't know how to analyze this construction. What indeed does *shmushmu* mean? Nobody can answer this question’.

Q introduces a confirmation2

- (16) **a.** *Il me semble qu'une nuance distingue ces deux mots; en effet, soit le dialogue suivant : ...* ‘It seems to me that there is a shade of meaning distinguishing these two words; let us consider the following dialog: ...’.
- b.** *Dans le raisonnement suivant, nous allons utiliser le théorème de Borel, qui nous permettra*

de résoudre les équations nécessaires. En effet, $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{considérons} \\ \text{nous considérons} \end{array} \right\}$ le cas des deux courbes mentionnées ci-dessus 'In the following argument we will be using Borel's theorem, which will allow us to solve the necessary equations. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Let us consider} \\ \text{We will consider} \end{array} \right\}$ the case of the two curves mentioned above'.

- c. *Vous pouvez vous en convaincre vous-mêmes facilement. En effet, $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{prenez} \\ \text{vous devez prendre} \end{array} \right\}$ deux nombres premiers...* 'You can convince yourself easily that this is true. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Take} \\ \text{You take} \end{array} \right\}$ two prime numbers ...'

Q is a confirmation₂ of the well-foundedness of ϵ

- (17) a. A: — *Dis donc, pourquoi le public reste ?* 'I am curious, why is the public still staying?'
 B: — *En effet, on a baissé le rideau* 'Indeed, they have dropped the curtain'.
 b. A: — *Va tout de suite au magasin !* 'Go to the store right away!'.
 B: — *En effet, il n'y a plus de pain* 'Indeed, we have no bread'.
 c. A: — *Demande au père, il peut te donner un bon conseil* 'You should ask Father; he's likely to give you some advice'.
 B: — *En effet, il a une vaste expérience dans ces affaires-là* 'Yes indeed, he has vast experience in such matters'.

Q is a confirmation₂ of an inference

- (18) a. *"Il suffira de raconter que vous avez un grain de poussière dans l'œil, et vous pourrez pleurer devant tout le monde autant qu'il vous plaira", lui dit Marie. Il descendit en effet, en se frottant les yeux avec son mouchoir* "It will be enough to say that you got a speck of dust in your eye, and then you can cry in front of everyone as much as you want", Mary told him. Indeed, he went down, rubbing his eyes with a handkerchief'.
 b. *J'étais certain que le petit bistrot devait se trouver au coin de la rue ; en effet il était là* 'I was certain that the small tavern must be at the street corner. Indeed, it was there'.

Russian V SAMOM DELE

⌈V SAMOM DELE⌋, adverbial

1. Parenthetical. *V samom dele*, [Q] 'indeed' =

The enunciator signaling

that the preceding utterance ϵ is well-founded

and that (the fact of uttering) Q is or introduces a confirmation₂ of the well-foundedness of ϵ ,

[Q].

Prosodic Properties

Phrasal stress on SÁMOM; lower pitch; a major pause after 'V S. D.'.⁸

Syntactic Properties

Occupies the leftmost syntactic position in the clause.

Lexical Functions

Syn_n : dejstvitel'no1; da; 'tak i est'

Anti_n : 'na samom dele'1

Examples

'Enunciator' (indirect speech)

(19) *On skazal, cto (i) v samom dele val'sirovala ona zamecatel'no* 'He said that she really did waltz magnificently'.

Q is a proof

(20) *On rasskazyval, cto èta dama zamecatel'no val'sirovala. V samom dele, ona zanjala pervoe mesto na Nacional'nom konkurse val'sa v 1927 godu* 'He was telling everyone that this lady waltzed magnificently. Indeed she won the National Waltzing Competition in 1927'.

Q is a causal explanation

(21) **a.** *Mne npravitsja ètot roman; v samom dele, v nèm govoritsja o ves'cax, kotorymi ja bol'se vsego interesujus'* 'I like this novel; you see, it speaks of things I find most interesting'.

b. *Predlo zennoe opisanie nosit ves'ma ograničennyj xarakter. V samom dele, ono bylo podgotovleno molodym issledovatelem, kotoryj byl nesposoben ucest' rjad važnyx slučaev* 'The proposed description is limited in nature. You see, it has been developed by a young researcher who was unable to consider a number of important cases'.

c. *Meteorolog ne mozet susčestvennym obrazom vlijat' na sostojanie atmosfery. V samom dele, u nego net sredstv, dostatočno mošnyx, ctoby konkurirovat' s ènergiej xotja by odnoj nebol'soj grozy* 'The meteorologist cannot influence the state of the atmosphere effectively. You see, he has no means powerful enough to compete with the energy released by a little thunderstorm'.

Q is a clarification

(22) **a.** *Èta dama zamecatel'no val'sirovala. V samom dele, ona val'sirovala tak, cto vse mužskie serdca bilis' v takt kolebanijam eë vozdušnogo plat'ja* 'This lady used to waltz magnificently. Indeed she waltzed in such a way that all men's hearts beat in time with the undulations of her vaporous dress'.

b. *Predlo zennoe opisanie nosit ves'ma ograničennyj xarakter. V samom dele, ono ne ucityvaet rjad važnyx slučaev* 'The proposed description is limited in nature. Indeed, it does not take

into account a number of important cases’.

Q is a confirmation1

(23) **a.** *On govoril, cto èta dama zamecatel’no val’sirovala. (I) V samom dele, val’sirovala ona zamecatel’no* ‘He used to say that this lady waltzed magnificently. She did indeed waltz magnificently’.

b. *A: — Masa tut takoe ucudila, cto v poru vracej vyzyvat’* ‘Masha behaved in such a loony way that we thought we’d better call a psychiatrist’.

B:— V samom dele, ona sovsem coknutaja ‘She is indeed completely nuts’.

Q is an interrogative sentence

(24) **a.** *A:— Cto-to Peti dolgo net, i ja nacinaju bespokoit’sja!* ‘Well, Pete is already late, and I am beginning to worry!’

B: — V samom dele, gde on propadaet? ‘Where indeed could he be?’.

b. *Ja ne znaju, kak nado analizirovat’ ètu konstrukciju. V samom dele, cto znacit "shmu-shmu"? Nikto ne mozet na èto otvetit’* ‘I don't know how to analyze this construction. What indeed does *shmushmu* mean? Nobody can answer this question’.

Q introduces a confirmation2

(25) **a.** *Mne kazetsja, cto mezdu ètimi dvumja slovami imeetsja lëgkoe smyslovoe razlicie; (*i) v samom dele, rassmotrim sledujuščij dialog: ...* ‘It seems to me that there is a slight semantic difference between these two words; let us consider the following dialog: ...’.

b. *V posledujuščix rassuzdenijax my vospol’zuemsja teoremoj Borelja. V samom dele, rassmotrim upomjanutyj vyše slučaj dvux krivyx* ‘In the following argument we will be using Borel's theorem. Let us consider the above-mentioned case of the two curves’.

Q is a confirmation2 of the well-foundedness of ϵ

(26) **a.** *A: — Interesno, počemu publika ne rasxoditsja?* ‘I am curious, why is the public still staying?’

B: — V samom dele, zanaves ved’ zakryli ‘Indeed, they have dropped the curtain’.

b. *A: — Idi skoree v magazin!* ‘Go to the store right away!’.

B: — V samom dele, xleba net ‘Indeed, we have no bread’.

c. *A: — A ty sprosil by otca, mozet, on cto i posovetuet* ‘You should ask Father; he's likely to give you some advice’.

B: — V samom dele, u nego ze bol’soj opyt v takix veschax ‘Yes indeed, he has vast experience in such matters’.

2. *V samom dele [Q]* ‘really’ =

The enunciator signaling

that his statement Q or the part Q of his statement is well-founded,

[Q].

Prosodic Properties

Sentential stress on SÁMOM; no pause after \bar{V} S. D.^{2.9}

Syntactic Properties

- 1) Q is (part of) a declarative sentence.
- 2) Normally, \bar{V} S.D.² immediately precedes Q.

Lexical Functions

Syn_n : dejstvitel'no²; \bar{V} na samom dele²; \bar{V} v tocnom (bukval'nom) smysle (slova)⁷; po-nastojascemu

Examples

- (27) **a.** *Vanja skazal, cto on v samom dele ljubit Masu* 'Vanja said that he really loved Masha'.
b. *Ja cut' ne poveril (a mozet daze v samom dele poveril), cto èto byla sutka* 'I almost believed (and maybe even really believed) that this was a joke'.
c. *Dvizeš'sja v tolpe bez vsjakoj celi, slivaeš'sja s nej psixiceski. I nacinaeš' verit', cto v samom dele vozmo zna odna mirovaja duša* 'You move aimlessly around in a crowd, you melt into it psychologically. And you begin to believe that the unified World Soul is really possible'.
d. *A ja, kak ty znaeš', v samom dele nikogda nicego ne delal* 'And I, as you know, really didn't ever do anything'.
e. *Kolja vcera sdelal v samom dele prekrasnyj doklad* 'Yesterday Kolya gave a really excellent talk'.
f. *I vdrug, posle trex nedel' o zidanaija, Nataša v samom dele polucaet pis'mo* 'Suddenly, after three weeks of waiting, Natasha really did receive a letter'.
g. *Otklikajas' na ego pros'bu, Kolja v samom dele pozvonil direktoru* 'On his request, Kolya had indeed called the director'.

3. Parenthetical. [Q], v samom dele, ' why on earth? / for goodness' sake / honestly' =

[Q],

the utterance Q expressing a negative emotion of the speaker with respect to the contents of Q, and the speaker signaling

that his negative emotion expressed in Q is well-founded.

Prosodic Properties

Phrasal stress on DÉLE; no pauses.

Syntactic Properties

Occupies the rightmost or the second rightmost position in the clause.

Lexical Functions

Syn_n : cert poberi!, cert voz'mi!; kakogo cërta; k cërtu; mat' tvoju!

Examples

(28) — *Cto ty menja ucis', v samom dele?* 'Why on earth are you advising me?'

(29) — *Nu kakoj on, v samom dele, lingvist?* 'Well, what the hell kind of linguist is he?'

(30) — *Da ne plac' ty, v samom dele!* 'Stop crying, for goodness' sake!'

(31) — *Nu cto vy, professor, v samom dele, perezivaete?* 'Why on earth are you worried, professor?'

4. Sentential. *V samom dele?* '{Oh) really?}' =

The speaker signals

that he doubts the truth of the preceding utterance of the addressee or is astonished by it.

Prosodic Properties

DOUBT: Sentential stress on DÉLE; higher pitch.

ASTONISHMENT: Sentential stress on SÁMOM; lower pitch.

Lexical Functions

Syn_n : dejstvitel'no3?; pravda?

Examples

(32) A: — *On vseгда ljubil tol'ko Masu* 'He always loved only Masha'.

B: — *V samom dele?* '{Oh) really?}'

4. Discussion of the Descriptions Proposed

4.1. 「EN EFFET」

4.1.1. 「EN EFFET」₁

4.1.1.1. Sentential Adverbials

We call an adverbial Adv *sentential* if and only if it can be used as a complete sentence (= between two major pauses); it is irrelevant whether Adv can or cannot be embedded under a higher predicate (via THAT), i.e. used in a subordinate clause. For instance, *Yes!* and *No.* are both sentential Advs.

4.1.1.2. Disjunction in the Definition

The definition of 「EN EFFET」₁ contains two disjunctions: one explicitly indicated by 'or'

(‘believing or knowing’) and the other one expressed via parentheses (the actual reading ‘... confirmation¹ of ... \mathcal{E} or of an assumption expressed through \mathcal{E} ’; parentheses are used as a purely notational device in order to alleviate the formulation). Disjunction is a powerful means, which formally allows one to unite any two arbitrary senses of one word within one definition. Therefore, the question arises: How do we draw the line? Where should two semantic elements ‘ σ_1 ’ and ‘ σ_2 ’ be related by a disjunction and be part of one definition (‘ L ’ = ‘... σ_1 or σ_2 ...’) and where should they go into two different definitions and thus be part of the meaning of two different lexemes (‘ L_1 ’ = ‘... σ_1 ...’, ‘ L_2 ’ = ‘... σ_2 ...’)? Our main criterion, based on Ockam’s razor, is as follows: If the distinction between two ‘suspicious’ semantic elements does not manifest itself in inflection/derivation of the word in question, nor in its syntactic behavior, nor in its lexical cooccurrence, then both elements are represented via disjunction in one definition; otherwise, they are relegated to two different definitions. It is this principle that does not allow us to unite under one definition ‘EN EFFET¹ and ‘EN EFFET²: their semantic differences are correlated with the differences in their syntactic properties: the first phraseme is a sentential adverbial, while the second one is parenthetical. (For more details on this criterion, as well for other criteria of disjunctive definitions, see Mel’cuk 1988: 181-184 and Mel’cuk *et al.* 1995: 60 ff.)

Note that disjunction is used in other definitions of the phrasemes under analysis, always following the same principle.

4.1.1.3. Semantic Components in the Definition

Our definition of ‘EN EFFET¹ follows the analysis of Danjou-Flaux 1980 in that it includes—reformulated in terms of our formalism—the three semantic components that she established (‘request for confirmation’, ‘agreement’, and ‘autonomy of the response’), whilst adding new components.

4.1.1.3.1. The Component ‘speaker’

‘EN EFFET¹ is a PERFORMATIVE expression: by uttering *en effet*, the speaker performs a speech action of confirming (‘I hereby confirm ...’). This status is reflected by the component ‘by uttering *en effet*, the speaker confirms¹ ...’.

Interestingly, in sharp contrast to such semantically close sentential adverbs as OUI ‘yes’ or NON ‘no’, ‘EN EFFET¹ cannot appear in a subordinate clause:

- (33) *Répondant à la question de Marie, qui voulait savoir s’il avait été hier au bureau, Jean a dit* { **qu’en effet* / *que oui/non* }, lit. ‘Answering Mary’s question about whether he had yesterday been in the office, John said { **that indeed* / *that yes/no* }’.

This fact follows from the strictly performative nature of ‘EN EFFET¹, while OUI and NON

have both performative as well as non-performative uses. In accordance with what has been said in 2.1.1, this is represented through the use of the semantic component ‘speaker’ (rather than ‘enunciator’) in the definition of \lceil EN EFFET \rceil_1 . Note that \lceil EN EFFET \rceil_2 is different in this respect: its definition contains ‘enunciator’ (rather than ‘speaker’).

4.1.1.3.2. The Component ‘request’

The component ‘[believing or knowing that the addressee] is REQUESTING from him [confirmation1 ...]’ constitutes the presupposition of the phraseme \lceil EN EFFET \rceil_1 . This is necessary in order to account for (im)possible continuations of the type illustrated by Danjou-Flaux 1980: 113:

(34) A : — *Je ne me suis pas encore beaucoup fatigué aujourd'hui* ‘I didn't tire myself too much today’.

B¹ : — *En effet* ‘Indeed’.

A¹ : — *De quoi te mêles-tu ?* ‘It is none of your business!’

vs

B² : — *Oui* ‘Yes’.

A² : # — *De quoi te mêles-tu ?* ‘It is none of your business’

[the symbol # indicates pragmatic inappropriateness of an otherwise semantically and syntactically correct sentence].

This presupposition distinguishes the meaning of the phraseme \lceil EN EFFET \rceil_1 from that of the sentential adverbs OUI ‘yes’ and NON ‘non’.

4.1.1.3.3. The Component ‘confirm1’

Since the definition of \lceil EN EFFET \rceil_1 (as well as that of \lceil EN EFFET \rceil_2) requires the use of the polysemous verb CONFIRM, we need to make more precise, at least in a preliminary way, the two senses which we will have recourse to; the sense ‘confirm1’ is defined below, and the sense ‘confirm2’ is defined in 4.1.2.2.3.

‘X confirms1 Y’ = ‘Reacting to someone having said "Y", || X says that "Y" is true because X independently believes or knows that Y is true’.¹⁰

(*I confirm his declaration; Two bystanders immediately confirmed his version of the events; John confirmed what Mary was saying.*)

The component ‘... because X independently believes or knows that Y is true’ distinguishes CONFIRM1 from, e.g., CONCUR or SHARE THE OPINION [*of*], which do not imply any PREVIOUS belief or knowledge by X: with these latter verbs, X might have begun to believe that "Y" is true only as a result of having heard his interlocutor. Thus:

(35) *Mary said that Father would probably arrive tomorrow; John* $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{*confirmed} \\ \text{concurred} \end{array} \right\}$, *although he had no way of knowing this for himself.*

It is this component, contained in the component 'X confirms1 Y', that distinguishes 'EN EFFET¹' and a simple OUI 'yes', as stated in Danjou-Flaux 1980: 114, for example:

- (36) A : — *Pierre est déjà à Paris* 'Peter is already in Paris'.
 B¹ : — *En effet.* [[#]*Je le savais.*] 'Indeed. I knew that'.
 B² : — *Oui.* [*Je le savais.*] 'Yes. I knew that'.

The answer (36-B¹) presupposes that B ALREADY believed or knew INDEPENDENTLY that Pierre was in Paris, so that the continuation *Je le savais* 'I knew this' sounds silly. *Oui* 'Yes', on the contrary, expresses nothing but the acceptance of A's words by B.

Note that OUI and 'EN EFFET¹' readily cooccur: *Oui, en effet* (in that order).¹¹ This is so because these expressions are by no means synonymous, 'EN EFFET¹' being more precise and specific than OUI.

Since orders, requests, warnings, promises, pieces of advice etc., as well as specific questions cannot be confirmed1 (in conformity with their pragmatic nature), 'EN EFFET¹' can be used only as a reaction either to statements or to those general questions which actually contain a hypothetical statement, i.e. an assumption (Danjou-Flaux 1980: 118):

- (37) a. A : — *Il fait beau ?* 'Is the weather good?'
 B : [#] — *En effet* 'Indeed'.
 vs.
 b. A : — *Il fait beau, n'est-ce pas ?* 'The weather is good, isn't it?'
 B : — *En effet* 'Indeed'.

4.1.1.3.4. The Component 'assumption'

The necessity of this component is clearly demonstrated in the preceding example (37b): uttering *en effet*, the speaker confirms [= CONFIRM1] an ASSUMPTION expressed through the interlocutor's question, namely, 'The weather is good', rather than the utterance itself: you cannot confirm a question.

4.1.2. 'EN EFFET²'

4.1.2.1. Parenthetical Adverbials

We call an adverbial Adv *parenthetical* if and only if it possesses the following three properties:

- 1) Semantically, the Adv's scope includes the whole utterance: it carries some information expressed by the enunciator concerning his own utterance.
- 2) Linearly, the Adv can occupy various positions in the sentence: at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end. **NB**: This is only a general trend; specific LUs may have additional restrictions imposed upon their typical linear positioning.
- 3) Prosodically, the Adv has a special intonation and may be separated from the rest of the

sentence by pauses.

For instance, *in fact* and *curiously* (as in *Curiously, the temperature rose the next day*) are both parenthetical Adv.s.

All parenthetical LUs are non-descriptive; they belong to the set of locutives, which express the enunciator's signaling some information concerning his utterance. (On the contrary, not all locutives are parentheticals: for instance, such conjunctions as Fr. CAR 'for, because', BIEN QUE 'although', PUISQUE 'since' are locutive but not parenthetical.)

4.1.2.2. Semantic Components in the Definition

4.1.2.2.1. The Component 'enunciator'

⌈EN EFFET⌋₂, unlike ⌈EN EFFET⌋₁, can be used in a subordinate clause: see (10). Therefore, the definition of ⌈EN EFFET⌋₂ includes the component 'enunciator', rather than 'speaker'.

4.1.2.2.2. The component 'the preceding utterance is well-founded'

The component 'the preceding utterance is well-founded' is introduced to express our intuition that ⌈EN EFFET⌋₂ is, so to speak, POSITIVELY left-oriented: by using it, the speaker signals that he supports the information contained in the preceding utterance \mathcal{E} ; even before the addressee hears Q, he knows, upon hearing *en effet*, that the speaker is trying to convince him that uttering \mathcal{E} is OK. This component is part of the semantic bridge between ⌈EN EFFET⌋₂ and ⌈EN EFFET⌋₁: this is so because 'be true' (in ⌈EN EFFET⌋₁, via 'confirm1') is a particular case of 'be well-founded'. On the other hand, we cannot use 'be true' in ⌈EN EFFET⌋₂ because the preceding utterance \mathcal{E} is not necessarily a statement: \mathcal{E} can be a question, a request, a piece of advice, etc., cf. (17).

Note that:

1) Some textual connectors are NEGATIVELY left-oriented. Thus, Fr. ⌈EN FAIT⌋ 'in fact' and ⌈EN RÉALITÉ⌋ 'in reality' signal that the information contained in \mathcal{E} is **not** (quite) OK and has to be replaced or supplemented—in the addressee's mind—with the information contained in Q.

2) Some textual connectors are not left-oriented at all, in the sense that they don't say anything about the 'quality' of the information contained in \mathcal{E} . Thus, ⌈FOR INSTANCE⌋ simply indicates that Q is an example illustrating \mathcal{E} , without evaluating the soundness of \mathcal{E} .

4.1.2.2.3. The Component 'confirm2'

Danjou-Flaux 1980 indicates two major types of logical relations between the utterance introduced by ⌈EN EFFET⌋₂ (= Q) and the preceding utterance (= \mathcal{E}): 'be a proof of ...' and 'be a causal explanation of ...'; these are what we call *textual relations*, known also as *rhetorical relations* (see, e.g., Mann and Thompson 1987, Iordanskaja and Mel'cuk 1995). Some examples manifest the first relation (cf. (11)), while some others show the second one (cf. (12)). However, many sentences with ⌈EN EFFET⌋₂ cannot be interpreted in terms of these two relations; thus in examples

(10) and (14), the relation between Q and \mathcal{E} is ‘be a confirmation1 of ...’, whereas in (13), it is ‘be a clarification of ...’. There might appear still other textual relations of this type; the situation obviously calls for an attempt at generalization. As such a generalization, we propose the component ‘confirm2’ = ‘be confirmation2 of’:

‘X confirms2 Y’ = ‘The fact X is such that the knowledge of it by α makes the information Y more convincing for α ’

(*This find confirms his declaration; The examples cited confirm the deficiency of existing dictionaries; What he saw only confirmed that John wouldn't be easy to manage.*)¹²

As we see, ‘confirm2’ covers ‘be a proof of ...’, ‘be a causal explanation of ...’ and ‘be a clarification of ...’ as particular cases: proofs, explanations, clarifications, etc. are always meant to make the preceding utterance more convincing, and the meaning of CONFIRM2 is, roughly, ‘make more convincing’.

However, ‘confirm2’ does not cover ‘be the confirmation1 of ...’, as in (10) and (14). In order to account for (14) as well, we add the optional component ‘(the fact of uttering Q)’. In (14), Q is a simple repetition by the speaker of the last utterance \mathcal{E} of the interlocutor; such a repetition (‘the fact of uttering Q’) makes \mathcal{E} more convincing.

4.1.2.2.4. The Component ‘introduces [a confirmation2 of]’

The disjunction ‘is or introduces [a confirmation2]’ is necessary since Q need not be itself a confirmation2 of \mathcal{E} : Q may only BEGIN the exposition of a confirmation2 (cf. 16a-c). Thus, in (34a) the sentence *En effet, le pouki-pouki a trois types de complément d'objet: direct, indirect et oblique* does not itself constitute a proof of the preceding statement; it simply begins the presentation of such a proof, i.e. of a confirmation2:

(38) a. *C'est une construction ergative. En effet, le pouki-pouki a trois types de complément d'objet: direct, indirect et oblique. Ces compléments ...* ‘This is an ergative construction: Pooki-pooki has three types of objects—direct, indirect, and oblique. These objects ...’.

Another example of the same type is (38b) (= (16b)):

b. *Dans le raisonnement suivant nous allons utiliser le théorème de Borel, qui nous permettra de résoudre les équations nécessaires. En effet, nous considérons le cas des deux courbes mentionnées ci-dessus* ‘In the following argument we will be using Borel's theorem, which will allow us to solve the necessary equations. Let us consider the case of the two curves mentioned above’.

Once again, the sentence *En effet, nous considérons le cas des deux courbes mentionnées ci-dessus* does not itself by any means confirm2 the preceding sentence; yet it begins a confirmation2 (as in (16a, c)).

4.1.2.2.5. The Component ‘belief that one could have ...’

The necessity of the component ‘belief that one could have as a result of preceding utterances’ in the definition of $\lceil \text{EN EFFET} \rceil_2$ is shown by the examples of the type (18). In (18a), the speaker signals, by his *en effet*, that the utterance which contains the phraseme confirms² the belief ‘advice has been followed’, which is strongly implied by the preceding utterance (the latter, being a piece of advice, cannot itself be confirmed²); in (18b), what is confirmed is not the speaker’s statement of certainty, but the belief the addressee can have as a result of this statement.

4.1.3. $\lceil \text{EN EFFET} \rceil_1$ vs. $\lceil \text{EN EFFET} \rceil_2$

$\lceil \text{EN EFFET} \rceil_1$ cannot be used in a subordinate clause (= it can be used only by the speaker); it can constitute an autonomous utterance; and it is a strict performative. $\lceil \text{EN EFFET} \rceil_2$, on the contrary, can be used in a subordinate clause (= it is used by the enunciator); it cannot constitute an autonomous utterance; and it is not a performative. $\lceil \text{EN EFFET} \rceil_2$ is a connector: by uttering it, the enunciator signals a particular textual relation between two fragments of text. These three distinctions are reflected by the following three differences in the definitions:

$\lceil \text{EN EFFET} \rceil_1$	vs.	$\lceil \text{EN EFFET} \rceil_2$
‘speaker’		‘enunciator’
‘confirms ¹ ’		‘signals that ...’
-----		‘Q is or introduces a confirmation ² of the preceding utterance’

4.2. $\lceil \text{V SAMOM DELE} \rceil$

4.2.1. $\lceil \text{V SAMOM DELE} \rceil_1$

No special comments concerning the definition are needed, since the meaning of this phraseme is included in that of $\lceil \text{EN EFFET} \rceil_2$, so that all relevant components have been already discussed. However, it is useful to draw the reader’s attention to the two following points.

First, for several speakers, the use of $\lceil \text{V SAMOM DELE} \rceil_1$ in indirect speech is highly colloquial or even substandard; they reject example (19). For this speech variety, the definition of the phraseme must include the component ‘the speaker [signaling]’ rather than ‘the enunciator [signaling]’. $\lceil \text{V SAMOM DELE} \rceil_1$ would then be different in this respect from $\lceil \text{EN EFFET} \rceil_2$.

Second, the phraseme in question has the antonym $\lceil \text{NA SAMOM DELE} \rceil_1$ ‘in (actual) reality’, which is often enough confused with $\lceil \text{V SAMOM DELE} \rceil_1$. But in fact these phrasemes, which are so close in form, express two different—actually, antonymous—textual relations: as we have said above, $\lceil \text{V SAMOM DELE} \rceil_1$ signals a CONFIRMATION² of \mathcal{E} , whereas $\lceil \text{NA SAMOM DELE} \rceil_1$ signals a REFUTATION of \mathcal{E} . Thus:

- (39) a. *Èti dva slova kazutsja pocti sinonimami. V samom dele, oni vzaimozamenimy praktičeski vo vsech kontekstax* ‘These two words seem to be quasi-synonymous. In point of

fact, they are mutually substitutable in practically all contexts’.

vs.

- b.** *Èti dva slova kazutsja pocti sinonimami. Na samom dele, oni ne vzaimozamenimy praktičeski ni v odnom kontekste* ‘These two words seem to be quasi-synonymous. But in point of fact, they are not mutually substitutable practically in any context’.

4.2.2. $\lceil V \text{ SAMOM DELE} \rceil_2$

$\lceil V \text{ SAMOM DELE} \rceil_2$ is different from $\lceil V \text{ SAMOM DELE} \rceil_1$ in the following four respects:

- $\lceil V \text{ SAMOM DELE} \rceil_1$ is parenthetical, having the whole utterance Q as its scope, while $\lceil V \text{ SAMOM DELE} \rceil_2$ is a regular adverbial and has as its scope the whole utterance Q or a part of it.
- $\lceil V \text{ SAMOM DELE} \rceil_1$ can introduce a declarative or interrogative utterance, while $\lceil V \text{ SAMOM DELE} \rceil_2$ —only a declarative one.
- $\lceil V \text{ SAMOM DELE} \rceil_1$ signals the well-foundedness of a preceding utterance (not necessarily by the enunciator) and thus expresses a textual relation (= confirmation₂), while $\lceil V \text{ SAMOM DELE} \rceil_2$ signals the well-foundedness of the utterance it is used in and so expresses no textual relation.

By using $\lceil V \text{ SAMOM DELE} \rceil_2$, the speaker insists that Q is applied quite correctly and thus puts some additional pressure on the addressee in a bid to convince him of the truth of the utterance. Cf. a similar description of the meaning of the French adverb RÉELLEMENT ‘really’ in Danjou-Flaux 1983: 130ff.; according to her analysis, RÉELLEMENT “attests the well-foundedness of the predication” (p. 140; translation is ours). The component ‘the well-foundedness of Q’ covers a vast range of interpretations: from the proper choice of the word (cf. *prekrasnyj* ‘excellent’ in (27e)) to the literal meaning of Q (*nikogda* ‘never’ in (27d)) to Q referring to an actual event rather than to something imaginary or presupposed (27f-g), etc.

4.2.3. $\lceil V \text{ SAMOM DELE} \rceil_3$

This phraseme is a parenthetical, like $\lceil V \text{ SAMOM DELE} \rceil_1$; its scope is as well the whole utterance, which must express—by prosodic means—a negative emotion of the speaker (indignation, annoyance, irritated surprise) aroused by what his utterance is about. As both $\lceil V \text{ S. D.} \rceil_1$ and $\lceil V \text{ S. D.} \rceil_2$, $\lceil V \text{ SAMOM DELE} \rceil_3$ carries the idea of well-foundedness, but in this case the well-foundedness of the emotion expressed. Note that $\lceil V \text{ S. D.} \rceil_3$ can always be omitted from the sentence in which it appears without affecting the emotionality of the utterance. But the insistence by the speaker on the well-foundedness of his negative emotion imparts to the utterance a slightly aggressive character, so that the use of $\lceil V \text{ S. D.} \rceil_3$ is incompatible with a highly respectful attitude.

No comments are needed on $\lceil V \text{ SAMOM DELE} \rceil_4$.

5. Semantic Comparison of the Vocables $\lceil \text{EN EFFET} \rceil$ and $\lceil V \text{ SAMOM DELE} \rceil$

To compare two vocables V_1 and V_2 semantically involves the following: First, we compare

the meaning of each LU of V_1 with that of the closest equivalent LU of V_2 ; in case such an equivalent does not exist in V_2 , we limit ourselves to indicating the closest equivalent from any other vocable available. Second, we repeat the same operation in the opposite direction—from V_2 to V_1 .

5.1. $\lceil \text{EN EFFET} \rceil_1 \sim ?$

Fr. $\lceil \text{EN EFFET} \rceil_1$ does not have a semantic equivalent within the Russian vocable $\lceil \text{V SAMOM DELE} \rceil$; actually, it does not have an exact Russian equivalent at all. The closest translation we can think of is DEJSTVITEL'NO 'indeed':

(40) **a.**—*Ty byl včera na rabote!* — *Dejstvitel'no. / Dejstvitel'no, byl. / Byl, dejstvitel'no. Da, dejstvitel'no.* 'You were yesterday in the office!—Indeed. / Indeed, I was. / I was, indeed. / Yes, indeed'.

b. A: — *Ja uverena, čto ty opjat' segodnja mnogo kuril* 'I am certain you have smoked far too much today'.

B: — *Dejstvitel'no* 'Indeed'.

(41) **a.**— *Ty ved' byl včera na rabote?* — *Dejstvitel'no. / Dejstvitel'no, byl. / Byl, dejstvitel'no. Da, dejstvitel'no.* 'You were yesterday in the office?—Indeed. / Indeed, I was. / I was, indeed. / Yes, indeed'.

b.— *"Star-Trek" ved' uže idët v "Urane"?* — *Dejstvitel'no. / Dejstvitel'no, idët. / Idët, dejstvitel'no. / Da, dejstvitel'no. Ja ego tam videl* 'Is *Star-Trek* already playing at the Uranus?— Yes, indeed. I saw it there'.

As examples (41) show, DEJSTVITEL'NO is not good as an answer to a question that contains a "positive" assumption—a context in which $\lceil \text{EN EFFET} \rceil_1$ is readily used. Even where DEJSTVITEL'NO is grammatically possible, it is not—in contrast to $\lceil \text{EN EFFET} \rceil_1$ —the preferred way of confirming₁; more current and natural is DA 'yes', followed by the repetition of the grammatical predicate (*Da, byl; Da, xorosaja* [as a reaction to *Pogoda ved' byla xorosaja?* 'The weather was rather good, wasn't it?']; etc.).

5.2. $\lceil \text{EN EFFET} \rceil_2 \sim \lceil \text{V SAMOM DELE} \rceil_1$

These two LUs are almost semantically identical, except for the disjunctive component ('a belief ϵ that one could have as a result of preceding utterances') in $\lceil \text{EN EFFET} \rceil_2$, which is absent from $\lceil \text{V SAMOM DELE} \rceil_1$. As a consequence, $\lceil \text{EN EFFET} \rceil_2$ can be used to signal the well-foundedness of an inference made on the basis of the preceding utterance, while $\lceil \text{V SAMOM DELE} \rceil_1$, taken alone (without the preceding particle I , see below), cannot:

(42) **a.** *"Prosto skazite, čto vam popala sorinka v glaz, i togda mozete plakat' skol'ko ugodno", — posovetovala Masha. *V samom dele, on vysel k gostjam, derza u glaz platok* 'Just say you have a speck of dust in your eye, and you can cry all you want,—Masha advised. Indeed, he came out, holding a handkerchief against his eyes' (cf. (18a)).

b. *Ja byl uveren, cto restorancik naxoditsja srazu za uglom; *v samom dele, on okazalsja imenno tam* ‘I was certain that the small restaurant was just around the corner; and indeed it was right there’ (cf. (18b)).

To use Rus. $\lceil \text{V SAMOM DELE} \rceil_1$ in order to render the meaning of Fr. $\lceil \text{EN EFFET} \rceil_2$ that implies the well-foundedness of an inference from the preceding utterance (rather than of this preceding utterance itself), we have to add to it the particle *I*, which, in this context, can be defined as follows:

$i P(Q)$ = ‘one of the assumptions expressed through the preceding utterance being confirmed₂, $P(Q)$ ’.

With the particle *I* added, the sentences (42a-b) become perfectly acceptable:

a'. *"Prosto skazite, cto vam popala sorinka v glaz, i togda mozete plakat' skol'ko ugodno",— posovetovala Masa. I v samom dele, on vysel k gostjam, derza u glaz platok.*

b'. *Ja byl uveren, cto restorancik naxoditsja srazu za uglom; i v samom dele, on okazalsja imenno tam.*

The particle *I* appears, with the same meaning, along with many other adverbs semantically related to $\lceil \text{V SAMOM DELE} \rceil_1$:

(43) **a.** *Ja dumal, cto Ivan zabolet; i verno* $\langle *verno \rangle$, *u nego vtoroj den' byla temperatura* ‘I thought Ivan was sick; and so he was: for the second day, he was running high fever’.

b. *Ja dumal, cto Ivan zabolet; tak i okazalos'* $\langle *tak okazalos' \rangle$ ‘I thought Ivan was sick, and indeed he was’.

c. *Ja dumal, cto Ivan ne pridët; i pravda* $\langle *pravda \rangle$, *on ostalsja doma* ‘I thought Ivan wouldn't come; and he wouldn't: he stayed at home’.

As one can see, the use of the particle *I* in these contexts is obligatory: it extends, so to speak, the definition of the corresponding adverbial, adding ‘assumptions ...’; and thus, in case of $\lceil \text{V SAMOM DELE} \rceil_1$, the meaning expressed becomes closer to that of $\lceil \text{EN EFFET} \rceil_2$.

Note that example (10) cannot be translated into Russian, using $\lceil \text{V SAMOM DELE} \rceil_1$:

(44) *Otvecaja na vopros Masi, byl li on vcera na rabote, Ivan skazal, cto* ^{??} *v samom dele* $\langle dejstvitel'no \rangle$ *byl* ‘Answering Mary's question about whether he had been in the office yesterday, John said that he had indeed been there’.

The reason seems to be due to the distinction discussed in this section: the meaning of $\lceil \text{EN EFFET} \rceil_2$ includes the component ‘belief resulting from ...’, which licenses its use in (10). More specifically, (10) means that John presumes that Mary's question expresses the belief ‘John was in the office’. $\lceil \text{V SAMOM DELE} \rceil_1$ does not have this component, and therefore it is unnatural in (44).

5.3. $\lceil \text{V SAMOM DELE} \rceil_2 \sim \text{RÉELLEMENT, VRAIMENT}_1$

The phraseme $\lceil V \text{ SAMOM DELE} \rceil_2$ does not have a semantic equivalent in the vocable $\lceil EN \text{ EFFET} \rceil$, yet it is more or less equivalent to $\lceil R\acute{E}ELLEMENT$ or $\lceil VRAIMENT \rceil_1$ 'really'; cf.:

(45) *On v samom dele ljubil Masu = Il aimait Marie* $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} *en\ effet \\ r\acute{e}ellement \\ vraiment \end{array} \right\}$ 'He really loved Marie'.

5.4. $\lceil V \text{ SAMOM DELE} \rceil_3 \sim ?$

The phraseme $\lceil V \text{ SAMOM DELE} \rceil_3$ has no semantic equivalent in French at all. The best rendering seems to be using the conjunction $\lceil MAIS$ (sometimes with $\lceil ENFIN$):

(46) a.— *Cto ty menja ucis', v samom dele?* = *Mais (enfin), pourquoi tu me donnes des leçons ?* 'Why on earth are you advising me?'

b.— *Da ne plac' ty, v samom dele!* = *Mais arrête de pleurer !* 'Stop crying, for goodness' sake!'

5.5. $\lceil V \text{ SAMOM DELE} \rceil_4 \sim \lceil VRAIMENT \rceil_2$

The phraseme $\lceil V \text{ SAMOM DELE} \rceil_4$, like $\lceil V \text{ SAMOM DELE} \rceil_2$, does not have an equivalent in the vocable $\lceil EN \text{ EFFET} \rceil$. Its standard equivalent is the adverb $\lceil VRAIMENT \rceil_2$.

(47) A: — *On vseгда ljubil tol'ko Masu = Il n'aimait toujours que Marie* 'He always loved only Marie'.

B: — *V samom dele?* = $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} *En\ effet \\ Vraiment \end{array} \right\} ?$ 'Oh really?'

NB : Our description of the phraseme $\lceil V \text{ SAMOM DELE} \rceil$ does not take into account another possible type of its uses, where it appears with the meaning 'in reality':

(48) *Menja scitajut lucse, cem ja est' v samom dele* = 'People think me better than I really am'.

We consider such uses not fully correct—in our opinion, a different phraseme should be used here: $\lceil NA \text{ SAMOM DELE} \rceil_2$. $\lceil V \text{ SAMOM DELE} \rceil$ is used in this sense by analogy, due to a strong formal resemblance to $\lceil NA \text{ SAMOM DELE} \rceil_2$.

6. Conclusions

The analysis and comparison of textual connectors $\lceil EN \text{ EFFET} \rceil$ and $\lceil V \text{ SAMOM DELE} \rceil$ has shown that, from the viewpoint of cross-linguistic semantic correspondences, connectors, 'words about the text', possess—at least, as far as we can judge from our extremely limited sample—the same properties as more "normal" descriptive LUs, 'words about the world'. National specificity of lexical meanings, which has been so often and so successfully discussed in linguistics, can be manifested in one of the three following ways:

- The lexical meaning $\langle L \rangle$ of language \mathbf{L}_1 has no close equivalent in language \mathbf{L}_2 . Given the context of this *Festschrift*, we can quote the example of Rus. TOSKA—the name of an emotion

that, as Wierzbicka has clearly shown (1992: 169-174), has absolutely no equivalent in English (nor in French, for that matter).

- The lexical meaning $\langle L(\mathbf{L}_1) \rangle$ of language \mathbf{L}_1 has an equivalent $\langle L(\mathbf{L}_2) \rangle$ in language \mathbf{L}_2 , but $\langle L(\mathbf{L}_1) \rangle \neq \langle L(\mathbf{L}_2) \rangle$. Again, we can quote Wierzbicka (1992: 66-75): Rus. SUD'BA [Y-a] 'all the important events that happen to Y independently of Y's will (in spite of Y's intentions or expectations)' must be translated as LIFE; for instance, the title of the book *Marina Tsvetaeva (Sud'ba. Karakter. Poèzija)* is rendered as 'Marina Tsvetaeva (Life. Personality. Poetry)', and there is no other good translation. Yet this equivalency, as can be seen from the approximate definition of SUD'BA given above, is far from ideal. The meaning 'sud'ba' is much more specific than 'life' or Rus. 'žizn' = 'life', for that matter: 'sud'ba' includes the idea of uncontrollability, which, everything else being equal, tends to imply bad, unfortunate events—as is the case with the above title (Let us add that a happy, accomplished life of a successful person cannot be designated as SUD'BA: there cannot be a book titled *Lucano Pavarotti (*Sud'ba. Karakter. Muzyka)*.)

- The lexical meanings $\langle L^1(\mathbf{L}_1) \rangle$ and $\langle L^2(\mathbf{L}_1) \rangle$ of language \mathbf{L}_1 have equivalents $\langle L^1(\mathbf{L}_2) \rangle$ and $\langle L^2(\mathbf{L}_2) \rangle$ in language \mathbf{L}_2 , but $\langle L^1(\mathbf{L}_1) \rangle$ and $\langle L^2(\mathbf{L}_1) \rangle$ belong to one vocable in \mathbf{L}_1 , whereas $\langle L^1(\mathbf{L}_2) \rangle$ and $\langle L^2(\mathbf{L}_2) \rangle$ in \mathbf{L}_2 belong to two different vocables. Continuing with Wierzbicka's example, we can point out that the three lexemes of the Russian vocable SUD'BA have English equivalents in different vocables: FATE, DESTINY, and LIFE.

The textual connectors considered in this paper illustrate all these three cases.

First, Fr. $\overline{\text{EN EFFET}}_1$, as shown, has no good equivalent in Russian at all; similarly, Rus. $\overline{\text{V SAMOM DELE}}_3$ has no equivalent in French.

Second, even the closest equivalents Fr. $\overline{\text{EN EFFET}}_2$ Rus. $\overline{\text{V SAMOM DELE}}_1$ are not semantically identical.

Third, three out of the four phrasemes of the vocable $\overline{\text{V SAMOM DELE}}$ have equivalents in French, but the latter do not belong to the same vocable: 1) $\overline{\text{V SAMOM DELE}}_1$ $\overline{\text{EN EFFET}}_2$; 2) $\overline{\text{V SAMOM DELE}}_2$ RÉELLEMENT and VRAIMENT₁; and 3) $\overline{\text{V SAMOM DELE}}_4$ VRAIMENT₂.

To emphasize the linguistic specificity of textual connectors, we will briefly consider the case of another French connector phraseme $\overline{\text{EN FAIT}}$ (see Iordanskaja and Mel'cuk 1995):

En fait, [Q] =

The enunciator signaling

that information concerning the 'state of affairs' α specified by the previous utterance ϵ or a belief ϵ that one could have as a result of preceding utterances is not (quite) good and that Q is a rectification or a more precise formulation of ϵ , so that it carries good information

concerning α ,
[Q].

This phraseme has no general equivalent in Russian: 'EN FAIT' receives a translation depending on the situation and sometimes receives no translation at all. Here are some representative examples (note that English lacks a direct equivalent as well):

- (49) **a.** *La tante ne fit aucune objection ; en fait, elle était ravie* 'Auntie did not object at all; in fact she was rather glad' *Tětja niskol'ko ne vozrazala; na samom dele, ona byla daze rada.*
- b.** *Envoie-moi les livres ; en fait, envoie-moi plutôt l'argent* 'Send me the books; or rather send me the money' *Prisli mne knigi; net, luscse prisli mne den'gi.*
- c.** *Pierre pleure, en fait il veut rentrer chez lui* 'Pete is crying; that is, he wants to go home' *Petja placet — on javno xocet domoj.*
- d.** *La police a reçu de méchantes lettres anonymes à son sujet; elles disaient, en fait, qu'il avait empoisonné Marie* 'The police received a few anonymous letters accusing him. Actually, the letters said that he had poisoned Mary' *V policiju prislo neskol'ko anonimnyx pisem s obvinenijami v ego adres. To cnee, v nix govorilos', cto on otravil Mari.*
- e.** *Je suis resté à la maison ; à écouter la radio, en fait* 'I stayed at home; that is, to listen to the radio' *Ja ostalsja doma — ctob poslusat' radio* [no equivalent for *en fait*].

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Notes

¹ (p. 00) The closest equivalent is INDEED, which is, therefore, used in most cases in the glosses to our examples. However, in many contexts, although INDEED passes, another, more specific, connector may be preferable (IN FACT, REALLY, YOU SEE)—or no connector is needed. Moreover, INDEED often seems stylistically inappropriate (sounds formal, too literary, etc.).

² (p. 00) A lexical unit is called performative even if it is only a particular form of this LU that can be used performatively. Thus the verb PROMISE is called performative, even if it is used performatively only in the 1st person singular in the present indicative (*I promise*).

³ (p. 00) The clumsy formulation 'X wants that Y does Z' is used in our semantic metalanguage because of its syntactic transparency and flexibility.

⁴ (p. 00) In point of fact, a non-descriptive LU may accept modification, but then lexically constrained modifiers only, that is, phraseologized collocations; cf., for instance, Fr. *Elle est venue seule, évidemment* 'She came alone, of course' ~ *Elle est venue seule, bien évidemment*, lit. 'She came alone, quite of course', where BIEN 'well, quite' is the value of Lexical Function **Magn** of ÉVIDEMMENT 'of course'. In much the same way, NATURALLY2 in (5d) can be modified by its **Magn** QUITE or VERY (see Apresjan 1986: 213, Iordanskaja 1992: 30).

⁵ (p. 00) Cf. BIEN QUE1 in *Bien qu'il pleuve, nous sommes sortis* 'Although it was raining, we went out'.

⁶ (p. 00) The symbol || separates the presupposition on its left from the main part of the definition.

⁷ (p. 00) The square brackets enclose the scope of the expression being defined, that is, in this particular case, the whole utterance minus *en effet*.

⁸ (p. 00) Phrasal stress is assigned to the strongest component of the phrase: *v sámom dele* rather than **v samom déle*.

⁹ (p. 00) Sentential stress is assigned to the strongest component of the sentence (what is sometimes called the focus : the carrier of the new information).

¹⁰ (p. 00) For a fuller and more elaborate definition of CONFIRM, see Wierzbicka 1987: 331.

¹¹ (p. 00) The reverse order is also possible: *En effet, oui*. However this expression sounds rather pompous and pedantic; it is often used in movies, etc. by snobbish bourgeois characters (as noted by A. Polguère).

¹² (p. 00) The other senses of CONFIRM, irrelevant in this context, are illustrated by the following examples: *Would you confirm your order / appointment?, I have already confirmed my flight*, etc.